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While many rating systems incentivize firms to improve their performance, I 
investigate how positive recognition from external stakeholders can lead to reductions 
in performance, rather than improvements. Drawing upon behavioral and performance 
feedback theory, I argue that positive ratings can lead firms to decrease their 
subsequent performance by reducing uncertainty regarding standards of acceptable or 
appropriate conduct. Assuming that firms will seek to avoid uncertainty, I propose that 
such ratings can lead high-performing firms to redefine their aspirations and thus 
reduce their subsequent performance. I test this main hypothesis, as well as several 
moderating effects, by examining how firms responded to a rating that evaluated their 
prior philanthropic efforts. My findings suggest that firms recognized for their 
generosity were, under certain conditions, more likely to subsequently reduce their 
philanthropic contributions. From a practical perspective, these results highlight the 
unintended consequences of social ratings and provide further insight for policy 
makers and stakeholders interested in motivating improvements in corporate social 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Carrots and sticks can achieve precisely the opposite of their intended aims. 
Mechanisms designed to increase motivation can dampen it. Tactics aimed at 
boosting creativity can reduce it. Programs to promote good deeds can make 
them disappear. (Pink, 2009, p. 35) 
On April 30
th
, 1991, Bryant Gumbel, co-host of NBC’s today show interviewed Amy 
Domini, co-founder of the well-known social ratings agency, KLD Research & 
Analytics, Inc (KLD). Founded in 1988, KLD’s primary objective was to provide 
information to socially-minded investors that would help them identify which 
companies were behaving in a more or less responsible manner. As stated on their 
website, KLD described its mission as “providing management tools to professionals 
integrating environmental, social, and governance factors (ESG) into their investment 
decisions” (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). 
During the interview with Gumbel, however, Domini revealed another, 
perhaps implicit, motive of the company. When asked about KLD’s long-term goals 
and objectives, she stated the following: “Our interest is to increase corporate 
accountability [emphasis added]. The goal here is to have a long-term impact. I think 
that’s the big shift in social investing. Historically it was sin avoidance and now it’s 
another voice for social change” (Gumbel, 1991). 
Although KLD was one of the first organizations to issue social ratings as a 
way of motivating improvements in corporate behavior, it is by no means the only 
one. The well-known 100 Best Corporate Citizens list, for example, has, since the year 
2000, been published annually with the explicit objective of “pushing the envelope on 
what represents good corporate citizenship” and “moving corporations towards better 
practices” (Waddock, Graves, & Kelly, 2000). Today, over 100 similar types of social 
rating and ranking institutions exist, 80 percent of which were founded in the last ten 
years (Sadowski, Whitaker, & Buckingham, 2010). Although not all of these 
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institutions intend to directly transform corporate behavior or to hold corporations 
more accountable (Espeland & Sauder, 2007), many do see their ratings as a 
particularly effective way to drive companies and society towards a more sustainable 
future (Sadowski et al., 2010). 
Underlying such ideologically-driven efforts is an implicit assumption that 
corporate behavior can be shaped through the use of rewards and punishments. Based 
on the theoretical foundations of behaviorism (Skinner, 1953) and standard economic 
theory, this “carrot” and “sticks” approach to motivation assumes that “the way to 
improve performance, increase productivity, and encourage excellence is to reward the 
good and punish the bad” (Pink, 2009, p. 19). Widely adopted and institutionalized 
within our homes, schools, and organizations as means of modifying and motivating 
improvements in individual behavior and performance, systems of reward and 
punishment are likewise seen as an increasingly effective tool to influence and control 
organizational behavior. Fombrun (1996), for example, noted that positive ratings are 
often given to organizations with the expressed hope that such recognition would spur 
imitation by poorly performing firms. Graham (2000, p. 36), likewise recognized 
shaming as “a newly potent political force” in shaping corporate behavior. 
The dramatic increase in the establishment and implementation of rating 
systems like KLD’s, while perhaps an indication of progress and success, has also 
spurred questions about whether recognition or shame actually lead to improvements 
in behavior and performance. Yet while the effectiveness of rewards and punishments 
has been studied extensively at the individual level, only recently have organizational 
scholars sought to examine how organizations respond to such incentives and whether 
and when they influence subsequent firm behavior and performance (Chatterji & 
Toffel, 2010; Jin & Leslie, 2003; Schlenker & Scorse, 2012).
1
 A common finding 
                                                 
1
 By performance, I mean the dimension of performance that corresponds to the particular social rating. 
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among the extant literature is that organizations that receive negative ratings tend to 
improve. The majority of this research, however, has not sufficiently addressed 
whether ratings that recognize an organization’s positive qualities and characteristics 
might similarly influence organizational behavior and performance. 
Given these insights, the goal of the dissertation is to investigate the following 
two questions. First, how do organizations respond to positive recognition? And 
second, under what conditions do they respond, i.e. when do they respond? In 
exploring these questions, I take a behavioral perspective (Cyert & March, 1963; 
March & Simon, 1958) and draw upon additional insights from psychology and 
economics to theorize how positive recognition might influence subsequent 
organizational performance. A central idea of the behavioral perspective is that 
organizational decision makers (i.e. managers) use aspiration levels when evaluating 
their organizations’ performance (Greve, 2003b). While prior research suggests that 
aspiration levels are formed based on the firm’s own performance history as well as 
the performance of similar others (Cyert & March, 1963), in this study, I argue that 
positive ratings can directly alter organizational aspirations by redefining the standards 
of appropriate and acceptable behavior. Assuming the firms will seek to avoid 
uncertainty and create negotiated environment (Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & 
March, 1963; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), such ratings could lead high-performing 
firms that meet or exceed the newly defined standard to redefine their aspirations and 
thus reduce their subsequent performance. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, my 
primary hypothesis is that positive ratings will lead to performance reductions rather 
than improvements. 
                                                                                                                                            
For example, the performance effects of an environmental rating could include subsequent changes in 
the release of toxic emissions (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Doshi, Dowell, & Toffel, 2013).  
 4 
While organizations can receive positive recognition in a variety of ways, in 
this study, I specifically focus on how firms respond to social ratings that recognize 
and reward firms for their generosity. My primary argument is that efforts to motivate 
high levels of corporate giving through the use of positive recognition can, under 
certain conditions, lead high-performing firms to reduce their subsequent 
contributions. I call this idea the paradox of recognizing responsibility. I test this 
hypothesis using ratings data from KLD, the oldest and most widely used social 
ratings database available to the public (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009; Chen & 
Delmas, 2011). Using a difference-in-differences methodology, I examine how 
hundreds of organizations responded to their initial ratings when KLD first began 
rating firms in 1991. 
In this study, I make several important theoretical and practical contributions. 
My first contribution is a redefinition of our understanding about how organizations 
respond to positive recognition. Indeed, the notion that positive recognition can lead to 
unintended consequences is not new. Psychologists, for example, have long 
recognized that efforts to motivate improvements in individual behavior and 
performance through positive recognition can often lead to outcomes that are 
“precisely the opposite of their intended aims” (Pink, 2009, p. 35). Despite this 
knowledge however, many rating institutions and stakeholders continue to operate 
under the untested assumption that the use of positive recognition as a reward is 
indeed an effective way to drive improvements in organizational behavior and 
performance. In this study, I question that assumption and subject it to rigorous 
empirical scrutiny. Drawing upon insights from social psychology, economics, and 
organization theory, I seek to not only provide a more nuanced understanding about 
how organizations respond to positive recognition, but also explain why and when it 
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might be more or less effective in shaping and modifying organizational behavior and 
performance. 
I also seek to extend performance feedback theory by examining how third-
party ratings can alter a firm’s aspiration level, a previously stated, yet unexplored 
assertion (Greve, 2003b). While behavioral scholars have long recognized the role of 
historical performance and social comparison in the formation of organizational 
aspirations, in this study, I argue and demonstrate how positive ratings can redefine 
organizational goals that can lead recognized firms to reduce their subsequent 
performance. 
From a practical perspective, this study thus highlights the unintended 
consequences of social ratings (Chatterji & Levine, 2006) and provides stakeholders 
interested in motivating improvements in corporate responsibility with valuable 
information about how independent rating systems can be designed in ways that 
promote societal benefit (Lydenberg, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I provide an in-depth 
review of the relevant literature, drawing specifically on insights and topics from 
psychology and economics. Following this review, I provide my own summary of the 
literature highlighting both the general conclusions that can be drawn from numerous 
studies as well as the gaps in our understanding that need to be filled. More 
specifically, I emphasize the importance of understanding how firms respond to 
positive recognition and introduce a setting in which this question can be adequately 
addressed. 
In chapter 3, I introduce the context of the empirical analysis by providing a 
brief history of socially responsible investing and the institutionalization of corporate 
social ratings. I then provide a detailed description of the KLD ratings, the primary 
data source for my empirical analysis. I conclude by performing a thorough review of 
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articles using the KLD data in order to highlight our limited understanding about how 
firms response to positive recognition. 
Chapters 4 and 5 contain my hypotheses and empirical results respectively. 
Beyond my main argument, I also examine several contingency factors that may 
moderate a firm’s response to the positive rating. Specifically, I hypothesize and 
examine how firm response to positive recognition will be moderated by several 
institutional and organizational factors. 
I discuss my findings and conclusions in Chapter 6. In this section, I outline 
my primary theoretical contributions, note the study’s limitations, and highlight areas 
for future research. I conclude with a general discussion about the policy implications 
of my research, focusing specifically on how social rating systems might be 
redesigned to maximize societal benefit. 
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CHAPTER 2: INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO 
REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS 
Research regarding the effects of rewards and punishments has deep historical roots, 
particularly with the disciplines of psychology and economics. Because an exhaustive 
review of these disciplines in relation to this topic would be beyond the scope on this 
study, in this chapter, I intend to highlight the important findings, concepts, and 
insights that scholars have accumulated over the years that could potentially inform 
our understanding about how organizations might respond to positive recognition. 
Given that these disciplines have evolved on somewhat separate paths, I review them 
separately. 
I first review the literature within the field of psychology. I begin by 
summarizing the basic tenets of behaviorism and their manifestations in society. 
Highlighting the work of Edward Deci and other influential psychologists and 
behavioral economists, I then seek to demonstrate that many of the foundational 
assumptions of behaviorism and the conventional wisdom of society regarding the 
efficacy of rewards as tool to influence and control behavior and performance are 
indeed false and unsupported by scientific record. I then make the argument that the 
unintended consequences of rewards and punishments at the individual level suggest 
that similar effects may occur at the organizational level. 
I then turn to the economic literature. Like behaviorism, neoclassical economic 
theory shares a similar belief that economic actors, both individuals and organizations 
respond to both punishments and rewards (i.e. incentives). Yet while much of this 
research has found broad support for the efficacy of punishment as motivational tactic, 
few studies have addressed the efficacy of rewards and positive recognition. 
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To address this gap, I thus propose to examine how organizations respond to 
positive recognition from independent ratings agencies that evaluate and recognize 
past superior performance. While ratings have been used to evaluate various 
dimensions of organizational behavior and performance, in this study, I intend to 
evaluate how large public corporations respond to ratings that evaluate their social and 
environmental performance. 
Individual-Level Responses to Rewards and Punishments 
Although the use of rewards and punishments as a means of controlling behavior has 
likely existed throughout human history, it wasn’t until the early 1900s that 
psychologists developed a theory to actually explain and systematize their effects 
(Kohn, 1999). Known as behaviorism, this intellectual tradition held that individuals 
or other living organisms might be predisposed, or conditioned, by their environments 
to behave in certain ways. Of particular import was Skinner’s (1953) theoretical 
framework of operant conditioning, a model of learning in which an organism’s 
behavior could be controlled through reinforcement or punishment. Using rats and 
pigeons as experimental subjects, Skinner and his colleagues ran hundreds of 
experiments and found broad support for the idea that behavior could be controlled by 
the conferral or withdrawal of rewards and punishments. Summarizing these findings, 
Deci et al. stated, 
When administered closely subsequent to a behavior, rewards were reliably 
found to increase the likelihood that the behavior would be emitted again, an 
effect that persisted as long as the reward contingency was operative. When 
rewards were terminated, the likelihood that the behavior would be emitted 
eventually returned to the prereward baseline. (1999, p. 627) 
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Although simple and perhaps intuitive, the consistency of this general finding led to 
the widespread advocacy of rewards as motivational strategy, particularly within the 
applied fields of business and education. 
Yet while behaviorism became the dominant school of thought during the 
1950s, it did not escape criticism. Maslow (1954), for example, questioned the idea the 
human behavior could be simply reduced to rat-like responses to positive and negative 
stimuli. McGregor (1960) likewise doubted behaviorism’s strong assumption that 
absent external rewards and punishments, humans beings were essentially inert. 
Responding to these concerns, psychologists interested in the study of human 
motivation began to reexamine the fundamental assumptions of the behaviorist 
tradition. 
The first empirical research to question this tradition emerged in the early 
1970s. At that time, Edward Deci, a graduate student at Carnegie Mellon, was 
interested in understanding how rewards influenced intrinsic motivation, that is, “the 
desire to engage in an activity for its own sake” (Kohn, 1999, p. 290). Through a 
series of experiments, Deci (1971, 1972) found that contrary to conventional wisdom, 
tangible rewards (i.e. money) could significantly reduce an individuals’ intrinsic 
motivation in an activity, thus leading him to the seemingly controversial conclusion 
that “one who is interested in developing and enhancing intrinsic motivation in 
children, employees, students, etc., should not concentrate on external-control systems 
such as monetary rewards” (Deci, 1972, pp. 119–120). 
Since that time, hundreds of studies have sought to replicate these results and 
further refine our understanding about how rewards influence motivation. With 
surprising consistency, these studies strongly support the conclusion that “tangible 
rewards tend to have a substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivation” (Deci et 
al., 1999). 
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Beyond reducing intrinsic motivation, rewards have also been shown to both 
diminish and amplify desirable and undesirable outcomes or behaviors respectively. 
Psychologists (and more recently behavioral economists), for example, have found 
extrinsic rewards to lead to reductions in performance (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, 
& Mazar, 2009; Glucksberg, 1962; Miller & Estes, 1961), creativity (Amabile, 1985, 
1996; Amabile, Hennessey, & Grossman, 1986; Amabile, Phillips, & Collins, 1993), 
and prosocial behavior (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Mellström & Johannesson, 
2008). On the flipside, recent research suggest that rewards may increase the 
likelihood of undesirable outcomes such as cheating and dishonesty (Ordóñez, 
Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), addictive behaviors (Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), and myopic decision-making 
(Cheng, Subramanyam, & Zhang, 2005; Ordóñez et al., 2009). As noted by Pink, these 
studies succinctly demonstrate that “carrots and sticks can achieve precisely the 
opposite of their intended aims. Mechanisms designed to increase motivation can 
dampen it. Tactics aimed at boosting creativity can reduce it. Programs to promote 
good deeds can make them disappear” (2009, p. 35). 
Indeed, forty years of work within the field of psychology has clearly 
demonstrated the unintended consequences of using extrinsic rewards as a tool to 
motivate improvements in behavior and performance.
2
 Despite this knowledge, 
however, much of our society continues to operate under the taken-for-granted 
assumption that the most effective way to “improve performance, increase 
productivity, and encourage excellence is to reward the good and punish the bad” 
                                                 
2
 Although the negative effects of rewards are well documented, social scientists have demonstrated a 
small number of circumstances under which they are effective. For instance, scholars have shown that 
the negative effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation primarily occur with contingent rewards (i.e. 
rewards promised upon completion of a task or behavior) (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). Rewards 
can also lead to increased performance, but only for mindless tasks that require little cognitive skill 
(Ariely, Gneezy, et al., 2009; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 2001). 
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(Pink, 2009, p. 19). Such an assumption permeates almost every aspect of our society 
including our schools, our organizations, and our homes. Teachers, for example, 
present “stickers, stars, certificates, awards, trophies, membership in elite societies, 
and above all, grades” to entice students to learn (Kohn, 1999, p. 11). From Wall 
Street to Main Street, boards and managers offer extravagant bonuses or special perks 
to CEOs and employees, all motivated by the simple idea that “the more money you 
offer someone, the harder he or she will work” (Francella, 1983, p. 53). Even at home, 
parents promise children special privileges for good behavior, extra dessert for eating 
their vegetables, or allowance when completing household chores. Indeed, systems of 
rewards and punishments are “so deeply embedded in our lives that most of us 
scarcely recognize that they exist” (Pink, 2009, p. 19). 
Beyond their intent of motivating individual behavior and performance, 
systems of rewards and punishments are likewise seen as an increasingly effective 
way to motivate improvements in organizational behavior and performance. Yet 
despite our vast understanding about how individuals respond to tangible and verbal 
rewards, we actually know very little about how organizations respond to these same 
motivational tools. Although there are indeed inherent conceptual differences between 
individuals and organizations,
3
 the consistency of the findings within psychology in 
regards to the negative effect of rewards suggest that similar negative effects may 
occur at the organizational level. In accordance with this assertion, I now turn to the 
economic literature to review our current understanding about how organizations 
respond to rewards and recognition. 
                                                 
3
 One would not necessarily expect rewards and punishments to drive changes in behavior and 
performance through the same theoretical mechanisms at the organizational level. It would be difficult, 
for example, to argue that corporations haven an “intrinsic motivation” to engage in certain activities or 
behaviors as most corporations, by legal status, are organized with the primary objective of maximizing 
profits. 
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Organizational-Level Responses to Rewards and Punishments 
The idea that rewards and punishments can be used to motivate improvements in 
organizational behavior and performance is strongly rooted in rational choice 
paradigm of modern economic theory (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Lazear, 2000). 
According to this theoretical framework, organizations or firms are assumed to be 
rational actors that respond to various incentives in order to maximize their profits. 
While such incentives continuously evolve through the market dynamics of supply and 
demand, they can also be manipulated by external actors or stakeholders who have an 
interest in ensuring that organizations act in accordance with the public good. These 
external stakeholders include both the government as well as private groups of 
concerned citizens. I therefore briefly review the literature on organizational response 
to government and other external stakeholders, also referred to as public and private 
politics respectively (Baron, 2003; Reid & Toffel, 2009), paying particular attention to 
the tools or tactics used, the mechanisms through which these tools and tactics 
influence behavior, and their effectiveness in motivating improvements in 
performance. 
Public Politics 
Since the rise of the modern bureaucratic organization (Weber, 1968), government 
regulators have utilized a variety of regulatory strategies to ensure that public and 
private organizations comply with the law and to motivate improvements in behavior 
and performance. While much of the early history of government regulation had been 
dominated by more direct regulatory approaches such as command-and-control 
strategies and voluntary compliance programs, recent decades have seen a shift 
towards more cost-effective strategies such as market-based incentives, and mandatory 
information disclosure (Fung, Graham, & Weil, 2007). 
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Command-and-Control. Command-and-control can be described as a 
centralized regulatory approach that relies on legislation, inspections, and sanctions to 
monitor and control the activities of organizations (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; 
Nash & Ehrenfeld, 1997). Such legislation usually takes the form of (1) performance-
based standards that specify certain performance expectations or goals or (2) 
technology-based standards that mandate the use of certain technologies or designs 
(Kleindorfer & Orts, 1998; Nash & Ehrenfeld, 1997). Underlying this approach is the 
assumption that organizations are “amoral calculators” (Kagan & Scholz, 1984), and 
will therefore only undertake costly measures to comply with public policy goals 
when specifically required to do so by law and when the cost on noncompliance is 
likely to be detected and harshly penalized (Becker, 1968; Gunningham, Thornton, & 
Kagan, 2005; Stigler, 1970). 
Command-and-control regulations typically drive changes in organizational 
behavior and performance through direct coercion. Organizations that fail to attain 
certain performance goals or adopt certain practices or technologies will often face 
fines, fees, or other civil and/or criminal penalties that can take a significant financial 
toll on the organization (Fung et al., 2007). Given the substantial costs associated with 
noncompliance, it is therefore unsurprising that most research has found command-
and-control regulations to be an effective tool in modifying and improving 
organizational behavior and performance (Cohen, 2000; Short & Toffel, 2008). 
Beyond direct coercion, threats of federal regulation have also been shown to have 
strong “general deterrence” effect on behavior, particular for organizations that share 
the same institutional field (i.e. industry or community) of the targeted organization 
(Reid & Toffel, 2009). 
Voluntary Programs. While command-and-control strategies have often been 
considered a favored policy tool for federal regulators because of their effectiveness at 
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ensuring compliance, critics have noted that the establishment of minimum standards 
of performance tends to encourage reactive responses rather than proactive solutions 
(Nash & Ehrenfeld, 1997). To thus motivate organizations to make “beyond-
compliance” improvements, federal regulators have also relied on voluntary programs 
that seek to motivate improvements in performance through rewards rather than 
punishments (Vogel, 2005). Organizations that join such programs generally make 
commitments to reach certain performance goals. Regulators, in turn, promise to 
provide feedback as well as public recognition for their efforts. The basic mechanism 
underlying these programs is the idea that public recognition will serve as a strong 
incentive for organizations to improve their performance, as such recognition will 
likely increase the organization’s reputation among consumers which can then lead to 
subsequent increases in demand for the organization’s goods and services. 
Nevertheless, while there has been some evidence to suggest that recognition spurs 
improvements in behavior and performance, particularly among firms with high levels 
of customer interaction (Arora & Cason, 1995; Arora & Cason, 1996), concerns about 
self-selection and other research design issues raise questions about the causal nature 
of these improvements (Harrison, 1998; Kleindorfer & Orts, 1998). 
Market-Based Incentives. Critics have also argued that command-and-control 
strategies tend to be economically inefficient and are unnecessarily slow and inflexible 
(Harrison, 1998; Nash & Ehrenfeld, 1997). To thus reduce the costs associated with 
direct government oversight, federal regulators have recently sought to harness the 
power of market forces to compel organizations to act in accordance with the public 
interest. Traditional market-based incentives include subsidies, taxes, or mechanisms 
for reassigning property rights and responsibilities (e.g., emissions trading schemes). 
Unlike command-and-control and voluntary programs which seek to punish and 
reward firms directly, market-based approaches seek to indirectly influence 
 15 
organizational behavior by altering market incentives. While some market-based 
initiatives have substituted for traditional command-and-control regulations, in most 
instances they serve as complements by adding flexibility and increasing cost-
effectiveness (Tietenberg, 1998). 
Mandatory Information Disclosure. One increasingly popular form of market-
based regulation is mandatory information disclosure. In contrast to traditional 
regulatory approaches that rely on elaborate systems of rewards and punishments, 
mandatory disclosure programs seek to indirectly promote and encourage changes in 
behavior through the power of information (Fung et al., 2007). Implicit in this 
approach is the assumption that consumers, investors, and other stakeholders lack full 
information regarding the behavior and performance of corporations and other public 
organizations (Akerlof, 1970). Such asymmetries in information arise because 
organizations know more about their products, practices, and performance than their 
stakeholders do (Weil, Fung, Graham, & Fagotto, 2006). By forcing companies and 
other public organizations to reveal previously hidden dimensions of their 
performance and behavior, regulators hope to alter the decision-making processes of 
consumers, investors, and other stakeholders in ways that create market or political 
pressures for organizations to modify their behavior (Fung et al., 2007) 
Information disclosure can drive improvements in organizational behavior and 
performance through three primary channels (Bennear & Olmstead, 2008). First, new 
information can alter consumer and investor demand for an organization’s goods or 
securities. Several studies, for example, have demonstrated how restaurant grade cards 
based on mandatory health inspections can alter consumer demand for food, thus 
creating strong incentives for restaurant operators to improve or maintain good 
hygiene (Jin & Leslie, 2003, 2009; P. A. Simon, Leslie, Grace, Jin, & et al., 2005). 
Research has also demonstrated that organizations with high levels of toxic emissions 
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are more likely to experience negative abnormal stock returns (Hamilton, 1995). Such 
reductions in investor demand can then encourage the dirtiest firms to significantly 
reduce their toxic emissions in subsequent years (Khanna, Quimio, & Bojilova, 1998; 
Konar & Cohen, 1997). 
Newly disclosed information can also encourage action by community activists 
and government regulators. Several studies, for example, suggest that upon learning 
the true level of pollution in their community, local nonprofits and other community 
activists can induce dirty firms to reduce their emissions or change locations (Baron, 
2001; Khanna et al., 1998). Neighborhood groups can also use the TRI data to lobby 
regulators and lawmakers to increase regulatory oversight (Oberholzer-Gee & 
Mitsunari, 2006). Even threats of stringent regulation might provide sufficient 
incentives to improve performance (Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000). 
Finally, information disclosure can also spark internal improvements in 
performance. Environmental audits, for example, help managers learn about current 
inefficiencies and opportunities for improvement (Blackman, Afsah, & Ratunanda, 
2004). In the case of mandatory information disclosure, the mere act of disclosing can 
lead managers to dispense for resources and attention towards problem issues that 
were previously ignored (Sharma, 2000). 
A substantial body of research has demonstrated that organizations do indeed 
respond to the release of new information. Several studies, for example, have found 
the mandatory disclosure of toxic emissions to lead companies to improve their 
environmental performance (Doshi et al., 2013; Khanna et al., 1998; Konar & Cohen, 
1997) . Similar improvements in behavior and performance have been found in the 
domains of food and water safety (Bennear & Olmstead, 2008; Jin & Leslie, 2003, 
2009; P. A. Simon et al., 2005), healthcare (Cutler, Huckman, & Landrum, 2004; 
Hannan, Kilburn, Racz, Shields, & Chassin, 1994; Peterson, DeLong, Jollis, 
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Muhlbaier, & Mark, 1998), and mortgage lending (Bostic & Surette, 2001; Munnell, 
Tootell, Browne, & McEneaney, 1996; Roth, 2003; Schafer & Ladd, 1981). Overall 
these results provide substantial support for information disclosure as a particularly 
effective regulatory tool. 
Private Politics 
While federal regulation certainly plays an important role in monitoring and 
motivating improvements in organizational behavior and performance, recent decades 
have seen a rise in “private politics” (Baron, 2001, 2003). Also referred to as civil 
regulation (Vogel, 2005), private politics can be conceptualized as the individual and 
collective efforts of private citizens, activists, social movement organizations, and 
other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to impose their will on other individuals 
or organizations without reliance on the law or government (Baron, 2003). By 
applying pressure to these organizations, these activists and social movement 
organizations seek to motivate changes in organizational behavior and performance 
that the government is either unwilling or unable to bring about (Vogel, 2005). 
Social Activism. Social activists and other NGOs generate pressures on 
corporations and other public organizations through various means. Some tactics, such 
as protests, boycotts, and media campaigns, are driven by social activists who seek to 
bring about change by influencing consumer and investor demand (Bartley & Child, 
2011). Boycotts, for example, are believed to be successful when they take potential 
revenue away from the firm, thereby putting pressure on organizations to change 
(King, 2008). Protests and other media campaigns can also inflict damage on 
organizations through “naming and shaming” (Baron, 2003; Bartley & Child, 2011; 
O’Rourke, 2005). Such shaming tactics are particular effective on organizations that 
seek to maintain a strong reputation or brand identity (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005; 
 18 
Vogel, 2005). Shareholder activism, defined as “use of ownership position to actively 
influence company policy and practice” (Sjöström, 2008, p. 142), is another 
increasingly popular tool in private politics. Such activism often takes the form of 
shareholder resolutions which are proposals made by shareholders intended to 
influence the decisions and strategies of the top management team (Reid & Toffel, 
2009). 
Although not all attempts to directly influence managerial decisions are 
successful, there does appear to be some empirical evidence that organizations and 
industries will modify their behavior and subsequent performance in response to these 
tactics. Boycotts and protests, for example, can create public image crises for 
organizations, which then motivate organizations to concede to activists’ requests 
(Friedman, 1985; King, 2008; Pruitt & Friedman, 1986). Media campaigns established 
with the intent to “name and shame” have also been shown to motivate improvements 
in both labor conditions (Bartley & Child, 2011) and environmental performance 
(Schlenker & Scorse, 2012). Finally, recent research provides evidence that both 
targeted firms and their institutional equivalents respond to requests made by 
shareholder activists (Reid & Toffel, 2009), particularly when requests complement 
increased regulatory threat by the government. Together, this body of work provides 
ample evidence that social activists and other NGOs can motivate significant 
improvements in organizational behavior and performance (Vogel, 2005). 
Private Regulatory Systems. Another way private politics shape organizational 
behavior and performance is through the creation of private regulatory institutions that 
define standards of appropriate behavior and performance (King & Pearce, 2010; 
Lenox, 2006; O’Rourke, 2003). Typically these standards originate as principles or 
codes of conduct that arise in response to large-scale crises (Nash & Ehrenfeld, 1997). 
The Ceres Principles, for example, were established to guide corporate behavior on 
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important environmental issues following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. Once 
standards are established, independent regulatory institutions then monitor 
performance and certify organizations that act in accordance with the standards 
(Bartley, 2003, 2005; O’Rourke, 2003). Because these institutions lack the authority of 
the state, they cannot force organizations to comply (Lenox, 2006). External 
endorsements, however, can increase both the legitimacy and reputation of an 
organization (Rao, 1994; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005; Sine, David, 
& Mitsuhashi, 2007), and thus provide strong incentives for uncertified organizations 
to improve (King & Pearce, 2010). 
Beyond setting standards, many private regulatory institutions also act as 
information intermediaries that rank and rate organizational behavior and performance 
(Bartley, 2003; Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; O’Rourke, 2005). Like mandatory 
disclosure, information disclosure by independent third-parties reduces the costs 
associated with private regulation by transferring the responsibility of monitoring and 
enforcement to the users of information (i.e. consumers, investors, communities, etc.) 
(Vogel, 2005). While some ranking and rating institutions see their primary objective 
as providing transparency, many also hope that the information they provide will 
create market or political incentives for organizations to modify their behavior (Weil 
et al., 2006). 
Although targeted organizations are not required to respond to requests made 
by private regulatory systems, there exists some evidence that these organizations do 
indeed respond. Organizations that receive low rankings, for example, often perceive 
the ranking as an identity threat (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Elsbach & 
Kramer, 1996) and are thus motivated to improve their performance in subsequent 
years. Consistent with this argument, Espeland and Sauder (2007) found that law 
schools unsatisfied with their US News and World Report ranking altered how 
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resources were allocated, redefined the work of their employees, and employed a 
variety of gaming strategies in order to improve their rank in subsequent years. 
Negative ratings have also been shown to spur improvements in behavior and 
performance. Chatterji and Toffel (2010), for example, found that firms that initially 
received poor environmental ratings subsequently reduced their release of toxic 
emissions compared to other firms. Likewise, Schlenker and Scorse (2012) 
demonstrated that regulated facilities that were removed from a “Top 10” worse 
polluter list increased their emissions by 50 percent more than they would have had 
they stayed on the list. 
Conclusions 
Two general conclusions can be derived from the literature on the performance effects 
of public and private politics. First, substantial support exists for the efficacy of 
punishment in motivating improvements in organizational behavior or performance. 
As noted, a number of studies have demonstrated that fines, fees, and other methods of 
direct coercion lead organizations to alter their practices and behaviors, albeit often at 
minimum level required to be in compliance with the law. Private regulatory tactics 
such as “naming and shaming” have also been shown to motivate improvements in 
behavior, particularly for organizations that view their reputation and brand as a 
source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
Second, despite implicit beliefs in the efficacy of rewards and recognition, we 
have a limited understanding regarding whether these tactics actually lead to 
improvements in organizational behavior and performance. One of primary reasons 
that we know so little about how organizations respond to positive recognition may be 
structural in nature. As noted earlier, most public and private efforts to motivate 
improvements in behavior and performance through rewards or recognition rely on the 
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voluntary participation of organizations. While positive recognition could very well 
motivate improvements in behavior and performance, organizations are not randomly 
assigned to join such programs, but rather join by self-selection. Such self-selection 
factors have been known to introduce bias in empirical analysis, thus making it 
difficult to evaluate the true causal nature of positive recognition (Kim & Lyon, 2011). 
Despite these methodological difficulties, understanding how organizations 
respond to rewards and recognition is important from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective as many public and private initiatives are founded upon the implicit belief 
that organizations, like individuals, will respond favorably to rewards and positive 
recognition. Furthermore, noting this lack of understanding, scholars have recently 
called for more research to examine how organizations respond to positive recognition 
(Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). I seek to address this call by examining how firms respond 
to third-party ratings that recognize past superior performance. To overcome the 
problems of self-selection associated with voluntary programs, I rely on an exogenous 
source of variation that occurred when the ratings were first issued. 
While third-party ratings have been used as means of evaluating various 
dimensions of performance and behavior,
4
 in this study, I seek to understand how 
large public corporations responded to the introduction of ratings that evaluated their 
social and environmental performance. As a relatively recent phenomenon emerging 
over the last 25 years, the rise and proliferation of social ratings is an ideal context in 
which to study how organizations respond to positive recognition as it allows the 
researcher to examine changes in firm behavior and performance in response to the 
introduction of the rating. In order to provide a more enriched discussion and 
                                                 
4
 Common examples of third-party ratings include Consumer Reports’ ratings of consumer products, 
Yelp’s ratings of restaurant quality, and Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ratings of credit worthiness.  
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description of these ratings, I briefly review the historical context under which these 
social ratings first emerged. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ORIGINS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 
AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY RATINGS 
Ratings that evaluate corporate social and environmental performance are a relatively 
recent phenomenon that grew out of the socially responsible investment (SRI) 
movement. Also known as sustainable, socially conscious, or ethical investing, SRI is 
an investment strategy that considers corporate responsibility and societal concerns, in 
addition to financial return, as valid components of investment decisions (“SRI 
Basics,” 2013). SRI has grown dramatically since the mid-1990s with assets under 
management growing from $639 billion in 1995 to $3.74 trillion in 2012. Today, 
nearly one in every nine dollars under professional management in the US is involved 
in sustainable and responsible investing. 
Initially intended to help individuals and organizations avoid making unethical 
or immoral investments, many socially-oriented investment funds now serve as rating 
agencies (Paul & Lydenberg, 1992) that rank and evaluate corporate social 
performance in order to help investors to “identify which firms are more or less 
responsible” (Vogel, 2005, p. 39). Although most rating agencies are not explicit 
about their intentions to pressure companies, many believe that providing investors 
with information is indeed an effective way to drive improvements in corporate 
behavior (Lydenberg, 2005). 
In the following sections, I briefly review the historical context and events that 
led to the emergence of socially responsible investment and the formation and 
institutionalization of corporate social ratings. I then discuss and describe in detail the 
KLD social ratings, the primary data source for my empirical analysis. 
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The Origins of Socially Responsible Investment 
The earliest origins of social investing can be traced back to the religious teachings 
and philosophies of early Christian churches. John Wesley, one of the founding fathers 
of Methodism, taught that proper use of money was the second most important subject 
of new testament teaching (Mackenzie, 1997). In 1744, he gave a sermon titled The 
Use of Money, which outlined the basic tenets of social investing; that fellow 
Christians should earn all they can, but not at the expense of conscience, or the 
expense of their neighbors wealth and health. The Quakers, likewise, emphasized 
pacifism and the “moral inconsistency of holding slaves” (Thomas, 1999, p. 460), and 
thus taught their members to refuse participating in war and the slave trade. Indeed, 
such morally-based teachings underpinned much of the investment behaviors of 
religious institutions and socially-minded investors through the first seventy years of 
the 20
th
 century (Godfrey, 2011) and their influence can still be seen today in the 
widespread avoidance of “sin stocks,” or investments made in companies that engage 
in the production of alcohol, arms, and tobacco (Schueth, 2003). 
Yet despite its early origins, SRI remained largely a fringe phenomenon until 
the early 1970s. At that time, themes of protest and activism arising from the Anti-
Vietnam War and Civil Rights movements, and concerns about the Cold War and 
equality for women, began to fuel greater concerns for corporate social responsibility 
and accountability (Schueth, 2003). Responding to these concerns, Luther Tyson and 
Jack Corbett, two Methodist ministers, founded the PAX World Fund in 1971, the first 
socially responsible mutual fund to exclude weapons makers from their portfolio. 
Other funds and investment agencies soon emerged employing similar types of social 
investment services (Godfrey, 2011). The US Trust Company (now Walden Asset 
Management), for example, was founded in 1975 as the first in-house research 
division of a bank dedicated to social investing. In 1982, Joan Bavaria established 
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Franklin Research and Development Corporation, the first money management firm to 
focus exclusively on social investing. By the 1980s, these social investment funds 
managed approximately $40 billion in assets (J. Shapiro, 1992) with the majority 
employing a passive investment strategy known as negative screening, or the 
systematic exclusion of objectionable investments (Kurtz, 2008). 
While some socially-minded investors were more comfortable taking a passive 
stance, others desired to take a more active role in changing corporate behavior. One 
such individual was Saul Alinsky. Upset over labor conditions and lack of recognition 
and opportunities for advancement for the black community of Rochester, New York, 
Alinksy, a noted community organizer and social activist, purchased enough shares of 
Eastman Kodak stock in 1967 to gain admittance to the company’s shareholder 
meeting. Once inside, Alinsky filed a proxy resolution demanding that the company 
do more for the young African American population in the community. Although the 
use of shareholder resolutions had been legalized by the SEC in 1942, this particular 
resolution was noteworthy for being the first direct demand by a shareholder for a 
large corporation to solve a social problem (Paul & Aquila, 1988). 
Such an event was a watershed moment in the history of shareholder activism 
and served as a catalyst for further demonstrations of activism and corporate 
engagement. In 1970, a group of young lawyers formed the Project for Corporate 
Responsibility, and shortly thereafter presented nine resolutions to General Motors, all 
of which addressed social issues faced by minorities, workers, and consumers (Paul & 
Aquila, 1988). Wanting a more active method to voice their religious beliefs and 
concerns, churches followed suit and soon became the largest submitter of proxy 
resolutions during the 1970s (Godfrey, 2011). 
Increased interest in social investing and shareholder activism also led to the 
formation of several new organizations. Founded in 1969, the Council of Economic 
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Priorities (CEP) published a variety of industry studies and reports on special topics of 
interest to consumers, activists, and public policy analysts (Paul & Aquila, 1988). In 
1972, religious investors and other faith-based institutions founded the Interfaith 
Council on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) as a way to organize their efforts into one 
collective voice. That same year, a group of major universities and foundations 
established the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington, DC with a 
similar mission of providing proxy research, analysis, and services to large 
institutional investors. Seeking to formalize and coordinate their efforts, early pioneers 
also established the Social Investment Forum, the industry’s first professional 
association. Founded in 1985, the Forum’s primary objective was to act as a 
facilitator, advocate, and national clearinghouse for information on social investing 
(Kinder, Lydenberg, & Domini, 1992). Together, these organizations served to 
increase awareness about social investing and establish legitimacy of the new 
burgeoning industry. 
A number of historical events also helped transform social investing from a 
fringe to a mainstream phenomenon (Paul & Lydenberg, 1992). Most noteworthy was 
the issue of divestment from South Africa. While opposition toward South Africa’s 
Apartheid system had been in effect since the United Nations issued Resolution 1761 
in 1962 (Godfrey, 2011), several high profile protests and shareholder resolutions 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s led many institutional investors, such as pension 
plans and universities, to divest stocks of companies doing business in South Africa.
5
 
Under intense political and economic pressure, many US companies slowly began to 
withdraw their operations from the country.
6
 Several unfortunate environmental 
                                                 
5
 According to Knight (1990), over 300 educational institutions had divested from South Africa by 
1988. 
6
 Paul (1989) notes that 143 companies had left South Africa by 1987 with 65% leaving during the 
years of 1986 and 1987. 
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disasters also occurred during the 1980s, including the Bhopal, Chernobyl, and Exxon 
Valdez incidents, which sparked further media scrutiny and helped to bring issues of 
corporate responsibility and accountability into the spotlight (Schueth, 2003). 
By the late 1980s, it was clear that a new industry and form of investing had 
emerged. The rise of socially responsible investment funds now allowed socially-
minded investors to customize their portfolios according to their values and priorities. 
Shareholder resolutions were also viewed as a particularly effective tool in driving 
improvements in corporate behavior. Professional organizations and industry 
associations further established the industry’s legitimacy and credibility within the 
broader investment community. Together these factors led the industry to grow from 
$40 billion in assets under management in 1984 to $825 billion by 1991 (J. Shapiro, 
1992). 
Along with this increased interest in social investing came a shift in strategy. 
No longer were investors simply interested in avoiding investments in certain 
companies. Having learned from their successes with proxy resolutions and the 
divestment from South Africa, many began to see themselves as agents of positive 
change. These shifts in identity and purpose led many investors to begin using 
“positive screens” in an effort to encourage improvements in the policies and practices 
of corporations. Unlike exclusionary screens, which investors used to keep their funds 
out of certain types of stocks, positive screens were used to identify and reward 
emerging companies applying progressive policies. Underlying these efforts was the 
belief that the “clout of the marketplace” could be harnessed to motivate low-
performing firms into reforming their irresponsible practices (“After South Africa: 
The state of socially responsible investing in the United States,” 1995). 
One limitation of this proactive approach, however, was that it required much 
more information and research regarding corporate social practices. While demand for 
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socially-screened investments was indeed high, information on corporate social 
performance was in limited supply. Unlike the financial and accounting information 
that was easily accessible in annual reports and SEC filings, data on a company’s 
environmental and social practices was often not publicly available or easily 
accessible and therefore costly and difficult to obtain. 
The Rise of Corporate Responsibility Ratings 
Seeking to fill this information gap, a number of organizations began to rate and 
evaluate corporate social performance and publicize their research. While impactful 
because of their novelty, these early rating systems were limited in scope, both in 
terms of the number of companies and social issues evaluated. The CEP, for example, 
had published a series of reports in the 1970s that rated the environmental and fair 
hiring practices of US corporations (Paul & Lydenberg, 1992). Although extremely 
informative, these reports tended to focus on single industries or specific issues which 
limited an investor’s ability to determine which companies were behaving more 
responsibly (Paul & Aquila, 1988). Striving to expand their scope and impact, the CEP 
later published the book Rating America’s Corporate Conscience which compiled data 
and social performance metrics on approximately 130 large corporations (Lydenberg, 
Marlin, & Strub, 1986). Many of the social and environmental issues evaluated in the 
book continue to serve as key dimensions of corporate social performance in present-
day rating systems. 
Another early rating system that achieved notable success was the Sullivan 
Principles (see Paul & Lydenberg, 1992 for a brief review). Created by Reverend Leon 
Sullivan in 1977, these principles served as a code of conduct for businesses operating 
in South Africa and were developed as a way to apply economic pressure on the 
Apartheid system. Companies that subscribed to the principles were evaluated on an 
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annual basis using a three-tiered rating system. Unlike previous social monitoring 
efforts that had focused on single companies (e.g. boycotts), the Sullivan principles 
achieved considerable success by evaluating a large number of companies on a 
relative basis (i.e. one to another), and by publicly announcing their progress annually. 
By the late 1980s, demand for information and data on corporate social 
performance was at an all-time high. Sensing an opportunity, many social investment 
agencies began to publicize and sell their research in the form of corporate social 
ratings (Paul & Lydenberg, 1992). One such agency was Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, 
& Co., Inc. (KLD), later renamed as KLD Research & Analytics, Inc.
7
 Established in 
1990 by Peter Kinder, Steven Lydenberg, and Amy Domini, KLD was one of the first 
social investment agencies to publish research designed to evaluate the risks and 
opportunities associated with corporate environmental and social performance (Cohn 
& Ball, 2009). 
Although the company is today widely known for their corporate social 
ratings, KLD was initially established on the idea of building an index that would 
track the costs and benefits of applying social screens to investment decisions (see 
Godfrey, 2011 for a more detailed review). Up to that point in time, the dominant 
logic within the industry, particularly among critics, was that investors who followed 
their conscience would do so at a cost; that narrowing the number of firms within a 
particular investment pool would limit an investor’s return. While she did not 
necessarily refute this claim, Amy Domini, a long-time social investment advisor, 
wanted to be able to objectively address investors’ concerns by establishing the true 
costs of social investing. Accordingly, she and her husband, Peter Kinder, began the 
arduous process of building their own stock index that would provide Domini a 
benchmark from which to sell her services. 
                                                 
7
 KLD was acquired by RiskMetics Group (RMG) in 2009. RMG was later acquired by MSCI in 2010.  
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Although the idea of an index that tracked socially responsible companies 
generated substantial interest, most investors were not comfortable with the seemingly 
subjective process of Domini hand-picking stocks (Godfrey, 2011). To resolve these 
concerns, Domini and Kinder recruited an old friend, Steve Lydenberg to help build a 
research database and design the methodology and overall structure of the index. 
Lydenberg had worked for a number of years with the CEP as well as Franklin 
Research and Development Corporation. As a co-author of the highly influential book 
Rating America’s Corporate Conscience published by the CEP, Lydenberg had 
substantial expertise in the evaluation of corporate social and environmental 
performance. 
To build credibility and familiarity with investors, KLD sought to establish a 
methodology of choosing stocks similar to that of other popular indices, in particular 
the Standard & Poors 500 Index (S&P 500). Like the S&P 500, which was maintained 
at 500 companies at all times, KLD constructed an index that would also maintain 400 
companies at a time. Stocks were also chosen by committee, thus matching the S&P 
policy of maintaining indexes by committee (Godfrey, 2011). Using the information 
from their research database, the committee then applied a series of social and 
environmental screens to the S&P 500, eventually generating a list of 250 firms. An 
additional 150 firms were added to the index, 100 from underrepresented industries as 
well as 50 smaller firms that had a strong social mission such as Ben and Jerry’s 
Homemade Inc. After months of diligent work, the index, formally called the Domini 
Social Index or the Domini 400, was officially launched in May 1990. 
Initially, the research database was seen as a tool that would facilitate the 
production and maintenance of the Index (i.e. a means to an end). The founders, 
however, soon realized that their most valuable product was the database. 
Accordingly, KLD quickly shifted their marketing strategy from providing investment 
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services via the fund to selling their research. While success came slowly at first, the 
company built up to $150 million in assets under management by 1995 (Godfrey, 
2011). Benefiting from the stock market boom of the 1990s and lacking any 
significant competition, the KLD ratings quickly became the “de facto standard” for 
research on corporate social and environmental performance (Waddock, 2003, p. 369). 
Although a number of new ratings schemes have emerged in recent years,
8
 KLD’s 
ratings continue to be the largest and most widely used multidimensional corporate 
social performance (CSP) database available to the public (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; 
Chen & Delmas, 2011; Deckop, Merriman, & Gupta, 2006; Graves & Waddock, 1994; 
Sharfman, 1996; Turban & Greening, 1997; Waddock, 2003). 
A Description of the KLD Ratings 
As an independent rating agency, KLD provides annual evaluations of the 
environmental, social, and governance performance of large public corporations based 
in the U.S. KLD first began to issue ratings in 1991 to members of the S&P 500 Index 
and the Domini Social Index. They later expanded their coverage to include the largest 
1,000 US companies by market capitalization in 2001 and the largest 3,000 companies 
by the same measure in 2003 (“MSCI ESG STATS: User Guide & ESG Ratings 
Definition,” 2012). Companies rated by KLD receive over 50 different ratings across 
seven distinct categories, which include the environment, community, human rights, 
employee relations, diversity, customers, and governance. To facilitate exclusionary 
screening, KLD also provides ratings on the following controversial business issues: 
Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power, and Tobacco. 
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 According to one recent report, there exist more than 100 independent corporate social ratings, with 
more than eighty percent emerging after 2000 (Sadowski et al., 2010).  
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Each rating is constituted by a binary variable that indicates whether the 
company has met certain criteria established for the rating. Some ratings are 
categorized as strengths (e.g. charitable giving, clean energy, minority representation, 
etc.) while others are categorized as concerns (e.g. substantial emissions, negative 
community impact, health and safety concerns, etc.). Both the strength and concerns 
ratings can be thought of as positive and negative screens which allow social investors 
to include or exclude certain companies base on certain environmental, social, and 
governance criteria (Kurtz, 2008). Ratings also differ in their degree of ambiguity. 
Some ratings, for example, specify clear standards of performance for inclusion while 
others are relatively ambiguous leaving substantial uncertainty about what might be 
required to achieve the rating.
9
 
KLD’s ratings are based on publicly available information as well as 
information directly collected from the company (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). When 
possible, KLD uses quantitative criteria to determine a rating to eliminate subjective 
judgment (Waddock & Graves, 1997). A group of experts meet regularly to discuss 
borderline cases (Godfrey, 2011). Prior to being published, ratings are sent to 
executive managers for review, thus giving firms an opportunity to respond to any 
discrepancies before the rating is made public (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009). 
While few have raised questions about the quality and credibility of the data (Chatterji 
& Levine, 2006; Entine, 2003),
10
 a number of researchers have found empirical 
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 For example, firms that give at least 1.5% of their pre-tax earnings to charity receive a positive rating 
for charitable giving. Such a rating creates an unambiguous standard of performance that is known by 
the firm. On the other hand, firms that develop and sell innovative products with environmental benefits 
are also recognized by KLD. Unlike the positive rating for charitable giving, however, the rating for 
beneficial products and services does not specify an absolute standard of performance required for 
recognition. 
10
 Scholars, for example, have argued that the common practice of aggregating individual performance 
ratings into larger constructs such as corporate social performance (CSP) destroys the information value 
contained in finger-grained measures (Godfrey et al., 2009; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Mattingly & 
Berman, 2006). In this study, I avoid this problem by evaluating how firms respond to individual item 
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support for the construct and historical validity of the ratings (Chatterji et al., 2009; 
Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Sharfman, 1996), further enhancing their legitimacy and 
credibility. 
According to KLD, their primary mission in issuing social ratings has always 
been to provide “management tools to professionals integrating environmental, social, 
and governance factors (ESG) into their investment decisions” (Chatterji & Toffel, 
2010, p. 920). Underlying this objective, however, is the assumption that revealing 
previously unknown information will create external pressures that motivate 
companies to improve (Doshi et al., 2013; Fung et al., 2007; Graham, 2000). 
Highlighting this implicit objective, Paul and Lydenberg noted that 
These systems clearly have an implicit social agenda [emphasis added], one in 
which certain corporate characteristics or actions are deemed “better” than 
others. By publicizing assessments of how corporations rate relative to each 
other on these issues, these ratings systems intend to push corporate 
management to improve its rating—that is, these systems are intended not only 
to influence consumer or employee choices, but also, and of even greater 
importance, to directly influence corporate behavior. (1992) 
Although KLD has never explicitly declared their intentions to pressure 
companies, statements made by its founders indicate that they too understood the 
magnitude of impact these ratings could have on corporate behavior.
11
 For example, 
when asked about the long-term goals of the KLD ratings, Domini stated, “Our 
interest is to increase corporate accountability [emphasis added]. The goal here is to 
have an impact. I think that’s the big shift in social investing. Historically it was sin 
avoidance and now it’s another voice for social change” (Gumbel, 1991). Lydenberg 
likewise noted that social ratings were an effective market mechanism for guiding 
                                                                                                                                            
ratings that can be linked directly to a specific performance dimension. 
11
 For further corroboration, see Appendix B: Interview with Steven Lydenberg. 
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“corporations to the public interest” (2005, p. 1). Although perhaps less ideologically 
driven, even Kinder acknowledged that the ratings could have an impact and 
“importance that really transcended what [their] original purpose had been” (Godfrey, 
2011, p. 7). 
Empirical Context: The Impact of Positive Recognition on Subsequent 
Charitable Contributions 
Despite KLD’s implicit intentions to increase corporate accountability, to date, only 
one study has empirically examined whether social ratings actually lead to 
improvements in social or environmental performance (see Appendix A for a complete 
literature review). Relying on an exogenous shock that occurred when KLD expanded 
the scope of their ratings in 2001, Chatterji and Toffel (2010), found that firms that 
initially received poor environmental ratings subsequently reduced their release of 
toxic emissions compared to other firms. Based on these results, one could effectively 
conclude that firms respond to negative social ratings by improving their subsequent 
social performance. 
Not all ratings agencies, however, seek to motivate improvements in corporate 
responsibility by way of embarrassment or shame (Graham, 2000). In fact, many 
social rating agencies, like KLD, seek to motivate improvements by implicitly or 
explicitly recognizing and rewarding firms that exhibit exceptional levels of social 
performance and responsible behavior. The magazine Business Ethics, for example, 
has since the year 2000, published an annual “100 Best Corporate Citizens” list with 
the explicit objective of “pushing the envelope on what represents good corporate 
citizenship” and “moving corporations towards better practices” (Waddock et al., 
2000, p. 17). Yet despite these proactive objectives, the majority of research has given 
little consideration to whether positive ratings might motivate improvements in 
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corporate social performance. Highlighting this gap in our understanding, Chatterji 
and Toffel (2010, p. 933) stated that “further research is needed to understand how 
organizations respond to positive ratings.” 
In accordance with this call, I investigate how positive social ratings influence 
subsequent corporate social performance. While KLD has rated firms across several 
dimensions of social performance, for this study, I focus on one particular rating that 
evaluates a firm’s charitable giving practices. Taking advantage of an exogenous 
shock that occurred when the ratings were first issued in 1991, I examine how the 
introduction of a new standard of giving influenced subsequent corporate charitable 
contributions. Seeking to not only address the question about how firms respond to 
positive recognition but also when, I also address how various institutional, 
organizational, and managerial factors might amplify or dampen firm response. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF POSITIVE RECOGNITION ON 
SUBSEQUENT CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
In recent years, scholars have demonstrated an increasing interest in understanding 
how organizations respond to ratings. Although much of this work has analyzed how 
organizations respond to negative ratings (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Elsbach & 
Kramer, 1996; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Jin & Leslie, 2003), limited attention has 
been paid to the performance effects of positive ratings. Understanding whether 
organizations respond to positive ratings is important, however, as many rating 
agencies believe that recognizing past superior performance is an effective way to 
motivate subsequent improvements. 
Underlying this belief are two implicit assumptions. First, it is commonly 
assumed that positive recognition will bring favorable attention and reputation to high-
performing firms which will then encourage imitation or improvement by low-
performing firms (Fombrun, 1996). Second, past theoretical work within the economic 
tradition suggests that firms recognized for their past superior performance have 
strong incentives to maintain consistent performance in the future as a decrease in 
performance may result in the loss of reputation which can impose long-term costs on 
the firm (Fombrun, 1996; Klein & Leffler, 1981; Noe, 2012; C. Shapiro, 1983). 
Together these assertions suggest that positive recognition will lead to improvements 
in firm behavior and performance, particularly among the unrecognized firms. 
Contrary to these assumptions, in this study, I seek to demonstrate that the 
introduction of third-party ratings that recognize past superior performance can, under 
certain conditions, lead firms to reduce their subsequent performance. Drawing upon 
the tenets of behavioral and performance feedback theory (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Greve, 2003b), I argue that positive ratings that define a specific threshold for 
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recognition reduce uncertainty about what constitutes an acceptable or appropriate 
level of behavior. Assuming that firms seek to avoid uncertainty and are limited in 
their ability to consider all possible strategies and outcomes (Argote & Greve, 2007; 
Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012), I maintain that 
positive ratings can lead recognized firms to perceive the new standard of performance 
as a satisfactory and acceptable benchmark to attain. Such changes in perceptions, I 
argue, will lead these firms to redefine their aspirations and thus reduce their 
subsequent performance. 
I evaluate this main premise, as well as several boundary conditions, by 
examining how firms respond to social ratings that recognize their philanthropic 
efforts. Corporate philanthropy is an ideal context in which to study the effects of 
ratings on organizational aspirations. Because they face substantial uncertainty about 
how much they should donate (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Galaskiewicz & 
Wasserman, 1989), firms often use decision rules to determine the appropriate level of 
giving. While prior research suggests that aspirations for giving are determined based 
on the firm’s past levels of giving as well as the giving of local peers (Marquis, Glynn, 
& Davis, 2007; McElroy & Siegfried, 1986; Useem & Kutner, 1986), here I argue that 
positive ratings that define a specific performance threshold can directly alter an 
organization’s aspirations for giving and thus lead recognized firms to reduce their 
subsequent contributions. 
This chapter is outlined as follows. First, I briefly review the basic concepts 
and assumptions of a behavioral perspective. I then provide a short description of 
corporate philanthropy, focusing specifically on the primary motives for giving and 
how decisions about corporate giving are made. Following this description, I then 
propose a series of hypotheses that predict how and when firms will respond to being 
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rated as a charitable organization. The data and methods used to test these hypotheses 
will be covered in the following chapter. 
Theoretical Foundations 
The origins of behavioral theory can be traced back to an intellectual movement that 
occurred within economics during the 1950s. Known as the Carnegie School, this new 
theoretical paradigm emerged as a “frontal assault” on the prevailing assumptions of 
the economic theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 8).
12
 Central to the Schools’ 
mission and identity were three basic premises: (1) that organizations should be the 
ultimate object of study, (2) that the scientific study of firm behavior and 
administration should focus on understanding the internal workings of an organization 
through closer examination of organizational decision-making, and (3) that theoretical 
models should exhibit behavioral plausibility, that is, that models should mirror 
empirical reality (Gavetti et al., 2012). While a focus on the organization as the 
primary unit of study was shared by most economists, the behavioral theory of the 
firm differed from the economic theory of the firm in a number of ways, most notably 
through its reconceptualization of human rationality. 
A central contribution of the theory is its reconceptualization of human 
rationality. Underpinning most economic theories is the rational choice paradigm, 
which assumes that economic actors operate with full knowledge of all possible 
choices and can therefore rationally weigh the costs and benefits of various 
alternatives and thus maximize their respective utilities. Contrary to this assumption, 
behavioral theorists hold that human decision makers possess bounded rationality and 
are, as a result, significantly constrained in their ability to process and calculate 
                                                 
12
 Many of behavioral theory’s seminal propositions and predictions were initially developed in the 
Schools’ three foundational works, Administrative Behavior (H. A. Simon, 1947), Organizations 
(March & Simon, 1958), and most notably, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963).  
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information (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; H. A. Simon, 1957). 
Instead of maximizing, organizational decision makers are thought to simplify the 
search for solutions by satisficing, which means that they seek solutions that are 
deemed to be satisfactory or acceptable, but not necessarily optimal. 
Consistent with the notion of satisficing is the assumption that organizational 
decision makers seek to avoid uncertainty by resorting to coping mechanisms that 
reduce cognitive effort and reduce the need to anticipate the future (Cyert & March, 
1963). Such mechanisms usually take the form of decision rules, standard operating 
procedures or routines, which specify how organizations should behave (Gavetti et al., 
2012; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Another way organizations avoid uncertainty is by 
creating a negotiated environment. Instead of treating the environment as an 
exogenous factor that must be predicted, firms “seek ways to make it controllable” 
(Cyert & March, 1963, p. 168). Firms, for example, can reduce uncertainty about a 
competitor’s actions by sponsoring the creation of industry-wide standards. Internal 
planning processes, such as budgets, can likewise provide an internal negotiated 
environment. 
Behavioral theory also places a particularly strong emphasis on understanding 
the formation of organizational goals and how these goals influence subsequent 
behavior and performance. Organizations are assumed to have wide range of goals, 
including profit, production, and even prestige (Cyert & March, 1963) that vary in 
importance and priority. Goals are chosen and implemented based on the interests and 
authority of the dominant coalition (generally assumed to be the top management 
team) and thus assigned to workers throughout the organization. Some goals, such as 
those surrounding firm profitability, have no upward bound and are therefore 
considered to be maximization goals. Other goals, like production and prestige, are 
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conceptualized as sub-goals that are subject to the constraints of more important goals, 
like firm profitability. 
While some organizational goals are aligned, others are inherently in conflict 
with one another. Cyert and March (1963, p. 146), for example, noted that “most 
organizations exist and thrive with a considerable latent conflict of goals.” Such 
conflicts are likely to be resolved through satisficing mechanisms such as sequential 
attention, which are decision rules that permit decision makers to attend to one goal at 
a time. These decision rules reduce conflict and cognitive effort by allowing decision 
makers to treat different goals as “constraints to be satisfied in some order of priority 
rather than as trade-offs that have to be weighed against each other” (Greve, 2008, p. 
480). 
Building upon this behavioral framework, recent research has sought to 
understand how organizational performance influences subsequent strategic decisions 
(Greve, 2003b). Known as performance feedback theory, this perspective argues that 
managers evaluate their organization’s performance relative to a goal or aspiration 
level (Greve, 2003a). Often defined as a “reference point that is psychologically 
neutral” (Kameda & Davis, 1990, p. 56), or “the smallest outcome that would be 
deemed satisfactory by the decision maker” (Schneider, 1992, p. 1053), an aspiration 
level is the result of a boundedly rational decision maker seeking to simplify 
performance feedback by “transforming a continuous measure of performance into a 
discrete measure of success or failure” (Greve, 1998, p. 59). 
Once an aspiration level is set, organizational decision makers then use it as a 
reference point in evaluating performance (Greve, 2003a). When performance falls 
below the aspiration level, organizations engage in problemistic search by seeking out 
solutions that will drive subsequent increases in performance (Cyert & March, 
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1963).
13
 Failure to achieve the aspiration also increases tolerance for risk as managers 
are likely to view poor performance as a loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and will 
therefore be more willing to take risks to improve (Bromiley, 1991; Lant, Milliken, & 
Batra, 1992). When performance exceeds the aspiration level, managers’ preferences 
for risky actions decrease (Greve, 2003b; March & Shapira, 1987; Singh, House, & 
Tucker, 1986). Such risk aversion can lead high-performing organizations to continue 
the status quo thus reducing the likelihood of organizational change (Greve, 1998, 
2003b). 
Prior research within the behavioral tradition suggests that aspirations are 
formed based on the organization’s past performance and the performance of similar 
others (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998, 2003a, 2003b). Less well understood, 
however, is how institutional elements from the external environment influence the 
formation of organizational aspirations (Gavetti et al., 2012; Gavetti, Levinthal, & 
Ocasio, 2007; Shinkle, 2012). Indeed, scholars have noted that third-party ratings can 
indirectly alter organizational aspirations by providing information that facilitates 
social comparison (Greve, 2003b). In this study, I extend behavioral theory by 
proposing that ratings can serve as a direct source of performance feedback to which 
firms respond. By redefining standards of appropriate and acceptable behavior, such 
ratings can directly alter organizational aspirations and thus lead high-performing 
firms to reduce their subsequent performance. Although evaluating organizational 
aspirations directly is an inherently difficult process,
14
 I can, nevertheless, observe 
                                                 
13
 Not all search activities are initiated by performance shortfalls. For example, increased organizational 
slack, often created by high past performance, can allow greater experimentation and organizational 
change (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1981). Other search activities, such as research and 
development, are institutionalized within organizations, and therefore occur as a planned result of the 
strategic planning and resource allocation process (Greve, 2003b). 
14
 According to one recent review of the literature, the overwhelming majority of empirical articles infer 
organizational aspirations based on historical and social factors. Because of data limitations, few are 
able to observe these aspirations directly (Shinkle, 2012).  
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whether firms behave in a manner consistent with my predictions. Confirmation of 
these predictions would suggest that efforts to promote improvements in behavior and 
performance through positive recognition can paradoxically lead to the opposite effect. 
Empirical Context 
As introduced in Chapter 3, I test my main argument, and several moderating effects, 
using social ratings data from the KLD STATS database, the largest and most widely-
used corporate social performance database available to the public (Deckop et al., 
2006).
15
Although KLD rated firms across several dimensions of social performance, 
for this study, I focus on one particular rating that evaluated a firm’s charitable giving 
practices.
16
 
A positive rating was given to firms that had consistently given over 1.5 
percent of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes, or had otherwise been notably 
generous in their giving. Because the rating was binary assessment, it could also be 
thought of as an accreditation, which has been defined as a non-rival assessment that 
compares economic actors against a fixed standard of performance (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008; Graffin & Ward, 2010). Although KLD did not explicitly describe 
their ratings as performance standards, implicit in their work was the assumption that 
defining a specific performance threshold would serve as a goal or baseline level of 
performance for unrecognized firms to achieve.
17
 
                                                 
15
 This database is now known as the MSCI STATS database. KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. was 
acquired by the Risk Metrics Group in 2009, which was then acquired by MSCI in 2010.  
16
 My reasons for focusing on the charitable giving rating were primarily instrumental. First, the 
charitable giving rating issued by KLD was one of the few ratings that defined a specific performance 
standard. Second, the level of charitable giving, the dimension of performance evaluated by the rating, 
was also relatively easy to collect and evaluate. 
17
 See Appendix B: Interview with Steven Lydenberg for corroborating evidence.  
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Overview of Corporate Philanthropy 
Corporate philanthropy can be defined as the voluntary, unreciprocated, or unilateral 
transfer of wealth to private nonprofit organizations (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; 
Fry, Keim, & Meiners, 1982; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Godfrey, 2005). 
Typically such transfers involve gifts or monetary contributions to various domains of 
social or public interest including the (1) arts and culture, (2) civic and public benefit, 
(3) education, and (4) health and human welfare (Marquis et al., 2007; Wang & Qian, 
2011). Although studied from a variety of theoretical perspectives, corporate 
philanthropy is generally considered a component or sub-dimension of several closely 
related theoretical constructs including corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Godfrey, 
2005), corporate social action (CSA) (Marquis et al., 2007), and corporate social 
performance (CSP) (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007). 
While the earliest record of corporate charitable contributions dates back to 
railroad boom of the late 1800s, it wasn’t until 1935 that the use of corporate funds for 
altruistic purposes was recognized as legal by the federal government (Andrews, 
1952). Such an endorsement, however, did not fully settle the legality of corporate 
contributions as corporations were organized under state law, not federal law. 
Uncertainty regarding the legal status of corporate contributions thus continued until 
1953 when the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that corporations were free to give 
to charities whether or not such donations were related to the business of the company 
(Muirhead, 1999). By the mid-1950s, other state courts followed suit. Together, these 
rulings helped to dispel corporate concern regarding the legality of their philanthropic 
actions. Corporate contributions increased dramatically as a result (Muirhead, 1999). 
Despite being a legal and institutionalized practice today, particularly among 
large public companies, corporate philanthropy continues to be a highly contested 
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issue (Karnani, 2010).
18
 Proponents of the shareholder maximization logic, for 
example, vigorously maintain that corporate philanthropy is an exploitation of 
shareholder value and that corporations contribute the most to social welfare through 
the production of economic goods, not charitable donations (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 
2002; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Although some have embraced strategic 
philanthropy as a way to address important social and economic goals simultaneously 
(Godfrey, 2005; Porter & Kramer, 2002), tensions between the firm’s social and 
economic objectives continue to remain. Highlighting this tension, Margolis and 
Walsh note: 
Corporate efforts to respond to social ills are not only in conflict with other 
objectives, they are themselves inherently provocative, highlighting in their 
very purpose their inconsistency with the firm’s economic objective. 
Therefore, these corporate efforts pose distinct management challenges. 
Ameliorative initiatives are simultaneously legitimacy-seeking and legitimacy-
threatening acts, adhering to one set of expectations, social in nature, while 
violating another, economic in nature. (2003, p. 288) 
Although companies may give for a variety of reasons, the majority of the 
extant research on philanthropy suggests that firms are motivated to give in order to 
(1) obtain legitimacy by meeting some minimum standard of acceptability or (2) build 
their reputational capital by distinguishing themselves from their peers (King & 
Whetten, 2008). A number of studies, for example, have demonstrated how 
corporations, in their quest for legitimacy, align their social practices with the norms 
and standards that emanate from local communities (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Guthrie, 
2003; Marquis et al., 2007; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Other studies have found 
charitable giving to be positively related to advertising expenses and degree of 
customer contact (Burt, 1983; Fry et al., 1982; Navarro, 1988), suggesting that firms 
                                                 
18
 According to Scott, “legitimate structures may, at the same time, be contested structures” (2008, p. 
61).  
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give in order to increase their reputation among consumers. One recent stream of 
literature posits that rather than generating shareholder value, philanthropic activities 
build a form of good will or moral capital that acts as a form of insurance to preserve 
the firm’s intangible assets (i.e. brand, reputation, public image, etc.) (Godfrey, 2005; 
Godfrey et al., 2009; Koh, Qian, & Wang, 2013). While conceptually distinct, all of 
these perspectives are aligned with the ideology of “enlightened-self-interest” 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991), the idea that giving benefits 
the long-term interests of the firm. 
Corporate donations are typically given indirectly through corporate 
foundations or directly through corporate giving programs. Foundations are legally 
separate entities that exist to pursue the philanthropic activities of its parent company 
(Marquis & Lee, 2013). Having a foundation enables firms to (1) smooth its giving 
over time in order to maintain steady levels of goodwill (Wolch, 1995), (2) maintain 
the independence of philanthropic decisions from other business decisions (Siegfried, 
McElroy, & Biernot-Fawkes, 1983), and (3) meet the external demands by 
stakeholders for internal accountability and control (Himmelstein, 1997). 
Relevant decisions within the context of corporate philanthropy include the 
focus, form, and level of charitable contributions (Marquis et al., 2007).
19
 For this 
study, I focus on the level of cash contributions, as ratings regarding corporate 
generosity most often evaluate the level of cash contributions as the primary criterion 
for distinguishing between generous and non-generous firms. 
Managers and top executives have been known to have considerable influence 
over the frequency, levels, and targets of charitable contributions. A number of 
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 The focus describes the particular domain of social problems or needs that the contributions are 
intended to mitigate or benefit (e.g. supporting the arts, education, health, etc.). The form of charitable 
contribution can be categorized as cash donations either directly by the company or indirectly through a 
foundation, or in-kind donations of products and services. The level of charitable contributions refers to 
the amount of contributions. 
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studies, for example, have demonstrated a strong relationship between managerial 
characteristics and firm-level philanthropic behaviors (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 
1988; Buchholtz, Amason, & Rutherford, 1999; Marquis & Lee, 2013; Siegfried et al., 
1983). Relationships with other leaders of other firms and non-profit organizations 
have also been shown to strongly influence the allocation and disbursement of 
corporate philanthropic donations (Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Useem & Kutner, 1986; 
Werbel & Carter, 2002). 
Although a number of scholars have argued that corporate philanthropic 
donations are an increasingly strategic and salient component of business social 
performance (Brammer & Millington, 2008; Godfrey, 2005; Porter & Kramer, 2002), 
charitable contributions are nevertheless discretionary expenditures often subject to 
the whim of managers and the constraint of financial resources (Buchholtz et al., 1999; 
Carroll, 1979). Such discretion arises because of the uncertainty that managers face in 
measuring and evaluating the costs and benefits of corporate donations (Galaskiewicz, 
1997). Such uncertainty, I argue, is also crucial to understanding firm response to 
ratings. 
Hypotheses 
Firm Response to Positive Ratings 
How much should firms give to charity? Standard economic reasoning suggests that 
firms should contribute at a level that meets a bare minimum for deriving benefits for 
the firm (Friedman, 1970). Drawing upon the economics of insurance, the risk 
management perspective likewise proposes that managers should engage in 
philanthropic activity that generates an optimal level of moral capital to insure the 
firm’s intangible assets (Godfrey, 2005). Indeed, both perspectives provide an “clear 
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conceptual stopping rule” in determining the optimal level of philanthropic activity 
(Godfrey, 2005, p. 791). 
Despite the simplicity and clarity of these arguments, prior research suggests 
that managers may lack the necessary information required to calculate the optimal 
level of philanthropic activity (Galaskiewicz, 1997). One reason for this lack of 
information can be attributed to the delays in feedback caused by inherent structure of 
the grants economy. As noted by Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 
In contrast to market economies, in which actors can tell if they are better or 
worse off in a given transaction, in a grants economy the donor does not see or 
experience benefits until far into the future. Thus although donors-may have 
preferences, feedback comes so slowly that donors often do not have the 
information they need to rechannel their resources to realize a more beneficial 
and efficient (i.e., less costly) outcome. (1989, p. 457) 
While delays in information feedback may indeed complicate the cost-benefit analysis 
of charitable contributions (Sinclair & Galaskiewicz, 1996), some managers may still 
be motivated to give by the belief that giving to charitable causes will somehow 
benefit the long-term interests of the firm (Davis, 1973; Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997).
20
 
Such beliefs, however, only confirm the assertion that managers know very little about 
the short-run consequences of their giving. Furthermore, recent reviews of the 
literature have found inconclusive evidence that higher levels of charitable giving 
actually lead to increased financial performance (Margolis & Walsh, 2003).
21,
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 Known as “enlightened self-interest,” this rationale was popular among corporate executives during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s (Galaskiewicz, 1997). 
21
 After performing a one recent meta-analysis, Margolis and Elfenbien summarized their findings as 
follows: “While doing good doesn’t appear to destroy shareholder value, we found only a very small 
correlation between corporate behavior and good financial results” (2008, p. 19).  
22
 Seeking to explain these mixed results, more recent empirical studies have proposed a non-linear 
relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance. Even these attempts, however, 
have produced mixed results. Brammer and Millington (2008), for example, found that firms with both 
unusually high and low charitable contributions had better financial performance than those making an 
intermediate level of contributions. In contrast to these findings, Wang, Choi, and Li (2008) found an 
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Collectively, these arguments suggest that firms are unlikely to know with certainty 
the economic consequences of their philanthropic activities. This lack of knowledge 
creates substantial uncertainty surrounding how much firms should give in order to 
achieve their reputational or legitimacy goals. 
From a behavioral perspective, firms are thought to manage uncertainty by 
resorting to coping mechanisms that reduce the need to anticipate distant futures 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012). Such mechanisms include satisficing 
decision rules that emphasize short-run responses to feedback and attempts to create a 
negotiated environment through coordination with external actors. Summarizing these 
arguments, Cyert and March maintain that firms “achieve a reasonably manageable 
prediction by avoiding planning where plans depend on predictions of uncertain future 
events and by emphasizing planning where the plans can be made self-conﬁrming 
through some control device” (1963, p. 119). 
In the case of corporate philanthropy, firms manage uncertainty about how 
much they should donate by relying on budgets and community norms. One survey of 
firms, for example, indicated that 90 percent of respondents determine the level of 
charitable contributions as part of their annual budget (McElroy & Siegfried, 1986). 
Others have argued that standards regarding the appropriate level of charitable 
contributions are embedded within local communities and that such standards vary by 
community, depending on the presence and density of local civic networks and 
institutions (Marquis et al., 2007). Both of these decision rules correspond closely with 
the notion that a firm’s aspiration levels, or goals, are formed and determined by 
historical and social factors respectively (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998, 2003b). 
                                                                                                                                            
inverse U-shaped relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance.  
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Such decision rules, however, may only reduce the uncertainty temporarily as firms 
are likely to revisit the decision year after year (Marquis et al., 2007). 
The exogenous introduction of a rating that establishes a fixed standard of 
performance for giving can also reduce uncertainty by establishing a baseline-level of 
performance that needs to be met in order to be recognized as a charitable firm. Like 
budgets and social comparisons, such ratings can become decision rules for firms to 
follow, particularly when the information required to make fully rational decisions is 
unavailable or difficult to obtain (Gavetti et al., 2012). In many ways, positive ratings 
that specify a new fixed standard may be superior to alternative decision rules as they 
do not require firms to revisit the decision each year and thus reduce the costs of 
information search and cognitive processing (Bitektine, 2011). Indeed, complete 
acceptance of the new performance standard as satisfactory and acceptable goal would 
be entirely consistent with the notion that firms will negotiate a structured 
environment in order to eliminate the uncertainty (Cyert & March, 1963). 
Positive ratings are also likely to bring substantial recognition and prestige to 
high-performing firms. Reputation scholars, for example, have argued that favorable 
ratings from expert intermediaries “impact the prominence of an organizations by 
certifying their achievement relative to explicit or implicit standards in given field” 
(Rindova et al., 2005, p. 1038). Such ratings are especially valuable in contexts, like 
corporate philanthropy, where the qualities and capabilities of a firm are difficult to 
assess (Graffin & Ward, 2010). 
Because positive ratings reduce cognitive effort and increase organizational 
reputation, I thus expect that recognized firms will be more likely to perceive the new 
standard as a satisfactory and acceptable benchmark to attain. Assuming that managers 
are boundedly rational (Cyert & March, 1963; H. Simon, 1957), just meeting the 
benchmark may in fact be the optimal response as high-performing firms can secure 
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their reputation as a charitable organization while simultaneously reducing costs 
(Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Given these arguments, I thus predict that high-performing 
firms whose prior level of giving exceeds the new rating threshold will decrease their 
subsequent philanthropic contributions. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms recognized for their charitable giving will subsequently decrease 
their philanthropic contributions more than other firms. 
The Moderating Effects of Institutional and Organizational Characteristics 
While accepting this new performance standard as an aspiration or goal would 
presumably be an attractive option to all firms recognized for their past generosity as it 
reduces uncertainty about how much they should give, the perceived costs and benefits 
of doing so may vary depending on various institutional and organizational factors. 
Previous work, for example, has noted that firm response to negative ratings is 
moderated by the effects of regulatory stringency and organizational efficiency 
(Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). Here I examine the effects of local communities, resource 
dependence, industry-specific risk, and financial performance. 
Normative Pressures from Local Communities. Prior research on patterns of 
charitable giving suggests that many firms face substantial local pressures to engage in 
corporate philanthropy. In a national survey of 2,776 companies, Guthrie (2003), for 
example, found that 91 percent of companies reported strong to moderate local norms 
for philanthropic activities. This finding is in line with other previous work that 
highlights the influence of local communities on corporate behavior (Kono, Palmer, 
Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis, 2003; Marquis & Battilana, 
2009; Marquis et al., 2007). 
Some of these normative pressures may arise from local institutions such as 
civic involvement groups (Marquis et al., 2007). Galaskiewicz (1985, 1997; 1991), for 
 51 
example, described how business and community leaders in Minneapolis established 
the “5-Percent Club,” a tithing club that expected its members to give 5 percent of 
before-tax profits to charity. Members that met the high standard were recognized at 
an annual luncheon by their peers and the public. Such recognition arguably 
incentivized and encouraged philanthropic activity in the community and helped to 
build the firm’s reputation among local community stakeholders. Supporting this 
assertion, Navarro (1988), found that the average contribution-to-sales ratio was twice 
as high for firms in cities with tithing clubs versus cities without tithing clubs. 
Firms may also feel pressure to contribute from their local peers. McElroy and 
Siegfried (1986), for example, found that the level of giving is significantly influenced 
by other firms within the local community. Communities with dense social networks 
are also effective at mobilizing social pressure for compliance with local norms 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985). Thus when faced with a decision about how much to donate, 
“the right answer hinges on the opinions of peers to whom the actor is socially 
connected” (Marquis et al., 2007). 
Given these findings, I propose that firms headquartered in charitable 
communities that are recognized for their philanthropic efforts will be less likely to 
reduce their subsequent charitable contributions. Charitable communities are likely to 
have strong social norms and networks that may generate expectations for giving that 
lie above the rating threshold. Because firms seek to resemble other organizations 
within their local communities (Marquis et al., 2007), such norms would likely 
discourage recognized firms from reducing their contributions. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms recognized for their charitable giving will be less likely to 
decrease their philanthropic contributions when headquartered in communities with 
strong norms for giving. 
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Consumer Orientation. Firm response to positive recognition may also be 
influenced by the degree to which firms are dependent on a positive reputation or 
public image. Because they sell directly to customers, firms operating within the 
consumer sector are likely to be more sensitive about their public image and therefore 
have greater incentives to make investments that will increase their reputation. 
One way firms can enhance their reputation is through charitable donations 
(Brammer & Millington, 2005; Godfrey, 2005). Like advertising, contributions can be 
used to negotiate favorable corporate images in the eyes of its customers by 
communicating the firm’s message, mission, intentions, and values (Galaskiewicz, 
1997; Haley, 1991; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). Consistent with these assertions, 
previous research has demonstrated that firms in industries that depend on consumer 
sales give more to charitable causes (Burt, 1983; Fry et al., 1982; Navarro, 1988). 
These same studies have also found significant correlations between advertising and 
charitable contributions. Finally, scholars have found a positive relationship between 
the level of giving and firm reputation (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990). 
Given these findings, I thus hypothesize that firms with a stronger consumer 
orientation will be less likely to decrease their subsequent contributions when 
recognized for their charitable giving. Because firms primarily operating in the 
consumer sector depend heavily on their reputation and public image, and because 
corporate philanthropy has been shown to enhance firm reputation among key 
stakeholders, consumer-oriented firms that are recognized for their past generosity 
may continue to give at levels that exceed the new performance standard as a way to 
distinguish the firm from it peers (King & Whetten, 2008). 
 53 
Hypothesis 3: Firms recognized for their charitable giving will be less likely to 
decrease their philanthropic contributions when doing business in consumer-oriented 
industries. 
Socially-Contested Industries. Recent work within the context of corporate 
philanthropy has argued that a firm’s charitable contributions can provide insurance-
like protection for its intangible assets (brand, reputation, public image, etc.) and that 
this protection helps to preserve shareholder wealth (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 
2009). Known as the risk-management hypothesis, this perspective proposes that two 
factors determine the optimal level of philanthropic activity: the level of wealth at risk 
(e.g. the value of the firm’s intangible assets) and the level of risk inherent in the 
firm’s operations and activities. While the level of risk surely has a firm-specific 
component, much of this risk is determined by the industry in which the company 
operates (Brammer & Pavelin, 2005; Godfrey, 2005).
23
 Accordingly, an important 
prediction from this perspective is that the optimal level of philanthropic activity will 
be higher for firms with higher industry-specific risk profiles. 
Consistent with this prediction, a number of studies have shown that higher- 
risk industries give more to charity (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2005; Williams & Barrett, 2000). For example, among large public 
companies in the U.K., Brammer and Pavelin (2005) found that firms operating in 
“high-risk” sectors contributed to charity at much higher levels than other firms. 
Furthermore, scholars have found the relationship between industry-specific risk and 
corporate giving to be particularly strong for firms operating within industries with 
significant social external ties (e.g. alcohol, tobacco, gambling, firearms, etc.) 
(Brammer & Millington, 2005). Firms in the tobacco industry, for instance, have been 
                                                 
23
 For example, firms operating in the mining sector face risks associated with environmental 
degradation while firms in the oil and gas sector face risks associated with climate change.  
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known to give generously to charitable causes, presumably as a way to counter 
negative publicity about its products (Godfrey et al., 2009; Koh et al., 2013). 
Given these findings, I thus predict that firms operating in socially-contested 
industries will be less likely to reduce their subsequent contributions when recognized 
for their charitable giving. Such firms arguably face a greater likelihood of 
experiencing a reputational loss given the inherent risks associated with their business 
operations. Because philanthropy has been argued to provide insurance-like protection 
against such losses, firms operating in socially-contested sectors that are recognized 
for their past generosity may continue to give at levels that exceed the new 
performance standard as way of providing insurance-like protection for their 
intangible assets. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms recognized for their charitable giving will be less likely to 
decrease their philanthropic contributions when doing business in socially-contested 
industries. 
Prior Financial Performance. Decisions about the appropriate level of 
charitable contributions are not solely based on organizational goals of reputation or 
legitimacy, but are also affected by other relevant organizational goals, in particular 
goals surrounding firm profitability. Because profitability is considered essential to the 
survival of any business organization, I expect that financial performance goals will 
become first priority when the prior financial performance of the firm is low. Since 
corporate philanthropy is often considered a discretional activity that is positively 
associated with organizational slack (Buchholtz et al., 1999; Dennis, Buchholtz, & 
Butts, 2007), corporate responses to social needs are likely to be in conflict with the 
firm’s economic objective when the firm is performing poorly (Margolis & Walsh, 
2003). Such goal conflicts are thought to be resolved through sequential attention 
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(Cyert & March, 1963), a rule which states that decisions makers attend to one goal at 
a time. According to Greve (2008), the order in which goals are attended to is not 
uniform across firms and may change over time depending on the preferences of the 
dominant coalition. When financial performance is low, however, profitability goals 
are likely to take first priority until performance goals are met. Given these assertions, 
I would therefore expect that when prior financial performance is low, firms rated as a 
charitable organization will shift their resources towards profitability goals, and thus 
reduce their subsequent charitable contributions. Such reductions will occur because 
the rating likely serves as a signal that the firm’s reputational goals have been met. 
On the other hand, prior research has shown that past organizational success 
can lead to strategic persistence. Some scholars suggest that organizations tend to 
repeat actions that are associated with positive outcomes (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Others suggest that organizations become committed to 
retaining proven competencies (Levitt & March, 1988). In one controlled experiment, 
researchers found that past success increased decision makers’ confidence that their 
current course of action was correct (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000). Given these 
findings, I therefore predict that when prior financial performance is high, firms noted 
for their charitable giving will be more likely to continue their current philanthropic 
strategies. Such firms, I suspect, may partially attribute their current financial success 
to their past levels of corporate generosity. On the other hand, firms that are not rated 
as a charitable organization, but are doing well financially are likely to attribute their 
financial success to other factors. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms recognized for their charitable giving will be more likely to 
decrease their philanthropic contributions when past financial performance is low. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA, METHODS, & RESULTS 
In this chapter, I empirically test whether firms recognized as a charitable organization 
will decrease their subsequent contributions as well as several institutional and 
organizational factors that could moderate this response. I begin my analysis by first 
giving a detailed description of the data. I then give a brief overview of the sample and 
methods. The chapter concludes with the results and additional robustness tests. 
Data 
Dependent Variable 
I evaluated a firm’s philanthropic contributions using the Taft Directory of Corporate 
Giving, the National Directory of Corporate Giving, and the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS), data sources on corporate philanthropy that have been 
used in prior organizational research (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Lev, Petrovits, & 
Radhakrishnan, 2010; Marquis et al., 2007; Marquis & Lee, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 
2013; Wang et al., 2008). Philanthropic contributions were defined as the total amount 
of grants given to charity through a corporate foundation or given by the corporation 
directly. Because many firms use a fixed percentage of pretax income to decide how 
much to give to charity (McElroy & Siegfried, 1986), I divided this total by the level 
of pre-tax income for each firm.
24, 25
 Such a transformation facilitates the comparison 
                                                 
24
 Corporate philanthropy as a dependent variable has been evaluated in a number of different ways. 
Some studies have used the total amount of contributions (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Marquis & 
Lee, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Others have scaled philanthropy by total revenue as a way to 
control for differences in firm size (Brammer & Millington, 2008; Navarro, 1988). In this study, I chose 
to evaluate corporate generosity as the total amount of contributions as a percentage of pre-tax income 
in order to maintain consistency with KLD’s evaluation practices (see below).  
25
 Using pre-tax income as a way to control for differences in firm size can nevertheless create problems 
for empirical analysis, especially when income falls below zero. Rather than remove these observations 
from the analysis, however, I instead replaced negative values (approximately 8% of the sample) with 
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of giving across various firms, as some firms are inherently more profitable than 
others by virtue of their industry membership. 
Independent Variables 
I obtained ratings of corporate philanthropic behavior from the KLD STATS database. 
Used widely in the fields of socially responsible investing (SRI) and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), the KLD ratings have been referred to as the “de facto research 
standard” for academic scholars in these fields (Waddock, 2003). KLD first issued 
social ratings beginning in 1991 for all members of the S&P 500 Index and the 
Domini Social Index. Because their decision to initially rate these firms was unrelated 
to prior firm behavior or performance and because firms had no influence on the 
decision to be rated, I argue that these initial ratings constitute an exogenous shock. 
For this study, I specifically focused on a rating that evaluated a firm’s 
charitable giving practices. A positive rating was given to firms that have consistently 
given over 1.5 percent of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT), or have 
otherwise been notably generous in their giving. Firm were given an opportunity to 
respond to a potential rating before it was made public. 
To distinguish between charitable and non-charitable firms, I created a dummy 
variable, initial positive rating, for firms that were recognized for their charitable 
giving practices in 1991. I also created a dummy variable, no initial positive rating, for 
firms that were rated by KLD, but were not noted for their charitable giving practices. 
                                                                                                                                            
predicted values generated through a linear interpolation. Because the total contributions are divided by 
pre-tax income, empirical problems can also result when pre-tax income is very small. Again, rather, 
that throw out these observations, I replaced levels of giving that exceed 10% of pre-tax profits (less 
than 1% of the sample) with predicted values generated through a linear interpolation. The 10% 
threshold was chosen because 10 percent of pre-tax profits is the maximum deduction allowed for 
corporate charitable contributions. While such transformations reduce the influence of outliers by 
smoothing levels of giving over time, it is nevertheless important to note that removing such outliers 
from the analysis did not substantively change the results or conclusions.  
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These firm-level dummy variables were then interacted with a time-varying dummy 
variable, KLD rated, coded ‘1’ starting in 1992 for the years in which firms that were 
rated by KLD, and ‘0’ otherwise.26 
Prior to the issuance of the KLD ratings, there existed few sources of 
information that would have facilitated the comparison of corporate responsibility 
across a large number of firms.
27
 Indeed, one of the primary motivating drivers behind 
the establishment of the KLD ratings was the lack of transparency and information 
regarding corporate social performance.
28
 Such a lack of transparency and information 
made it both difficult and costly for interested stakeholders to make comparisons 
among firms and thus form reputational beliefs about which firms were more or less 
responsible. Given these assertions, it is therefore unlikely that any observed response 
by rated firms would have been caused by any factor other than the KLD rating. 
                                                 
26
 While the ratings were issued in 1991, I did not expect them to have any significant influence on 
corporate donations until the following year as inertial factors such as budgets and commitments to 
nonprofits would have likely constrained an immediate response.  
27
 The Conference Board issued an annual industry-level survey of philanthropic donations beginning in 
1974. While such information allowed firms to benchmark their level of contributions against their 
industry peers, firms were not individually recognized for superior levels of giving, nor were interested 
stakeholders able to make comparisons of generosity across a large number of firms. Fortune magazine 
also issued its well-known Most Admired Companies ranking beginning in 1983. As a subset of the 
overall ranking, the magazine evaluated companies on several dimensions of stakeholder interest, 
including community and environmental responsibility. Only the top and bottom three ranked 
companies for this particular sub-dimension, however, were actually listed in the magazine. 
Furthermore, while the level of a firm’s philanthropic contributions would presumably be positively 
correlated with their responsibility score, companies could demonstrate social and environmental 
responsibility in many other ways besides corporate donations. Given these factors, it is therefore 
unlikely that the Fortune rankings would have been used as a significant source of information on 
corporate giving. Sponsored by the CEP, Steven Lydenberg, co-founder of KLD, co-authored a book 
titled Rating America’s Corporate Conscience. Published in 1986, the book compiled data and 
assessments of various social and environmental practices of corporations, including corporate 
philanthropy. While these ratings could in many ways be considered the closest predecessors to the 
KLD ratings, evaluations were nevertheless limited to approximately 100 firms (Godfrey, 2011).  
28
 See Godfrey, 2011 as well as Chapter 3 for more information regarding the establishment of the KLD 
ratings. 
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Moderating Variables 
Charitable Communities. Following prior research (Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013; 
Marquis et al., 2007; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013), I operationalized a local community as 
a core-based statistical area (CBSA) established by the Office of Management and 
Budget. According to the Census Bureau, a CBSA is a “core area containing a large 
population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high degree of 
economic and social integration with that core.” In his seminal work on corporate 
philanthropy, Galaskiewicz (1985, 1997) found that local giving was often stimulated 
by the presence of social clubs dedicated to local giving. Known as tithing clubs, these 
organizations have been known to exhibit strong, normative pressures for members to 
donate to the community. Prior research, for example, has found that the average 
contribution-to-sales ratio is twice as high for firms in cities with tithing clubs versus 
cities without tithing clubs (Navarro, 1988). I therefore coded charitable community as 
‘1’ for CBSAs that have tithing clubs, and ‘0’ otherwise.29 A dummy variable, non-
charitable community was coded as the inverse of charitable community. 
Consumer Orientation. Following an industry classification utilized in 
previous studies (Lev et al., 2010; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013), I partitioned the sample 
of firms into two categories. Firms whose primary customers were individual 
consumers were categorized as having a high consumer orientation, while firms 
whose primary customers were other firms were categorized as having a low consumer 
orientation. Categories were based on the firm’s four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes, which identify the line of business best represented by the 
company’s core operations. As would be expected, firms with a high consumer 
orientation had significantly higher sales, return on assets, and market value than firms 
                                                 
29
 Communities with tithing clubs during the window of analysis include Baltimore, Birmingham, 
Denver, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Louisville, Minneapolis, Norfolk, Phoenix, Rochester, San 
Francisco, and Seattle (see Navarro, 1988).  
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with a low consumer orientation. At the time the ratings were issued (fiscal year 
1991), the largest high consumer orientation firms (by sales) were General Motors, 
Ford, and AT&T, while the largest low consumer orientation firms were Exxon, IBM, 
and Mobil. 
Socially-Contested Industry. Beyond its qualitative ratings that evaluate 
various dimensions of corporate social performance, KLD also provides exclusionary 
screening information for involvement in the following controversial business issues: 
Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power, and Tobacco. Using this data, 
and following recent work by Koh et al. (2013), I thus created a dummy variable 
socially contested industry for firms that are involved in at least one or more of these 
controversial business issues. A dummy variable, non-socially contested industry was 
coded as the inverse of the variable socially contested industry. 
Prior Financial Performance. I calculated each firm’s prior financial 
performance by averaging the industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) for the pre-
rating period (1989–1991). A firm with a positive industry-adjusted ROA was 
considered to be a high-performance firm, coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. A dummy 
variable, low-performance firm was coded as the inverse of high-performance firm. 
Control Variables 
I controlled for other factors that might influence corporate philanthropic behavior 
including regulatory context, financial performance, and organizational size (Atkinson 
& Galaskiewicz, 1988; Brammer & Millington, 2008; Fry et al., 1982; Galaskiewicz, 
1985, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Marquis & Lee, 2013; Muller & Kräussl, 
2011; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). I controlled for the regulatory context and other time-
invariant factors such as corporate culture and geographic location using firm fixed 
effects. I also controlled for time-variant factors such as organizational size using the 
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number of employees, assets, revenue, foundation assets, and financial performance 
using return on assets (ROA), calculated as income before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets. Finally, I included year dummies to control for unobserved time-
variant factors that affect all firms such as changes in policy or societal norms. 
Methods 
Sample 
Because I was interested in how firms responded to their initial KLD ratings, I 
compared firms first rated by KLD with firms not rated by KLD in the sample period. 
Including the latter controlled for unobserved factors that could affect the social 
performance of all, not just rated firms. 
The analysis began in 1989, two years before KLD began to rate firms, and 
extended through 1994. The sample included 458 companies from a wide variety of 
communities and industries (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). Sample firms met all of the 
following criteria: were listed at least once in the TDCG or NDCG or the TDCG 
during the pre-rating (1989–1991) and post-rating (1992–1994) period, were members 
of the S&P 900 Index at some point during the window of observation,
30
 and were 
established public companies during or before 1989. Summary statistics and 
correlations are provided in Table 4. 
  
                                                 
30
 The S&P 900 index is a combination of the large-cap S&P 500 index and the mid-cap S&P 400 
index. Together, these indices cover approximately 86% of the U.S. market capitalization. 
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Table 1. Sample breakdown: Full and split samples 
  
Total number of 
firms 
 
Initial positive 
rating 
 
No initial 
positive rating 
 
Firms never 
rated 
  
Count % 
 
Count % 
 
Count % 
 
Count % 
Full sample: 458 100   56 12   297 65   105 23 
Split samples:            
 Charitable community 60 13  10 2  38 8  12 3 
 Non-charitable community 398 87  46 10  259 57  93 20 
 High consumer orientation 243 53  37 8  156 34  50 11 
 Low consumer orientation 215 47  19 4  141 31  55 12 
 Socially contested industry 63 14  10 2  53 12  0 0 
 Non-socially contested industry 395 86  46 10  244 53  105 23 
 High-performance firm 213 47  19 4  150 33  44 10 
  Low-performance firm 245 53   37 8   147 32   61 13 
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Table 2. Community composition 
CBSA Code CBSA Name 
Number of 
firms 
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA MSA 56   
16980 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI MSA   40  
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH MSA   18  
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD MSA 18  
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA 17  
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI MSA 17  
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA    15  
19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX MSA   12  
19820 Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI MSA   12  
40060 Richmond, VA MSA    11  
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA MSA 11  
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA MSA   10  
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT MSA   10  
47900 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA 10  
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH MSA   9  
38300 Pittsburgh, PA MSA    9  
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA MSA  8  
26420 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX MSA   7  
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA MSA   7  
16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA  6  
25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT MSA 6  
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI MSA  6  
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA MSA  6  
12580 Baltimore-Towson, MD MSA   5  
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN MSA   5  
19740 Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO MSA   4  
28140 Kansas City, MO-KS MSA   4  
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ MSA   4  
Various Other metropolitan charitable communities 8  
 Other metropolitan communities   105  
  Foreign-owned firms operating in the US     2   
  Total       458   
Charitable communities are highlighted in bold. Other charitable communities (with number of firms in 
parentheses) include Birmingham, AL (2), Jacksonville, FL (2), Norfolk, VA (1), and Rochester, NY 
(3). 
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Table 3. Industry composition 
SIC code Description 
Number  
of firms 
49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services    49 
 28 Chemicals and Allied Products   46 
 60 Depository Institutions    43 
 20 Food and Kindred Products   27 
 35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 24 
 37 Transportation Equipment   24 
 48 Communications    20 
 63 Insurance Carriers    17 
 26 Paper and Allied Products   17 
 36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components 16 
 38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments 16 
 27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries   15 
 33 Primary Metal Industries    12 
 13 Oil and Gas Extraction    11 
 73 Business Services    11 
 29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries   10 
   Other Industries       100  
  Total       458   
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
    Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Philanthropic contributions 0.99 0.97 0 9.52            
2. KLD rated X initial positive 
rating 
0.06 0.24 0 1 0.13           
3. KLD rated X no initial 
positive rating 
0.32 0.47 0 1 -0.08 -0.18          
4. Charitable community 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.10 0.04 0.00         
5. High consumer orientation 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01        
6. Socially contested industry 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.14       
7. High-performance firm 0.47 0.50 0 1 -0.18 -0.06 0.05 0.07 0.02 -0.06      
8. Employees (log) 2.90 1.10 0.42 6.65 0.06 0.10 0.13 -0.01 0.11 0.29 -0.12     
9. Revenue (log) 8.01 1.17 4.68 11.82 0.01 0.07 0.19 -0.01 0.07 0.26 -0.15 0.85    
10. Assets (log) 8.34 1.48 4.92 12.44 -0.04 0.04 0.15 0.01 0.13 0.19 -0.14 0.57 0.79   
11. Foundation assets (log) 1.19 1.19 0 5.59 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.28 0.37  
12. Return on assets (ROA) 4.98 5.68 -43.02 52.24 -0.12 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.10 -0.05 0.43 -0.07 -0.33 -0.15 0.04 
Note. 2,637 firm-year observations. 
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Descriptive Results 
I first examine the raw data to look for evidence of whether firms’ philanthropic 
donations change after being rated. I find that firms initially recognized as a charitable 
organization gave on average 1.97 percent in the pre-rating period and 1.50 in the 
post-rating period. This drop of 0.47 percentage points stands in contrast to the change 
experienced by firms not initially recognized for their giving, for which the level of 
giving increased only slightly from 0.85 percent to 0.88 percent. This is both a 
statistically significant as well as a substantive difference in trends.
31
 
Model Specification 
I tested the models using a difference-in-differences approach to compare firms’ 
charitable contributions before and after being rated, and used as a reference group 
those that were not rated. I tested Hypothesis 1 by estimating the following model:
32
 
                                             
                                                          
          
                                                 
31
 To determine whether the difference in trends was statistically significant, I used OLS pooled 
regression (with robust standard errors clustered by firm) to estimate the following model: y = β1Pi + 
β2NPI + β3(Pi x Rit) + β4(NPi x Rit) where y = total contributions as a percentage of pre-tax profits, Pi is a 
firm-level dummy coded ’1’ for firms that initially received a positive rating, NPi is a firm-level dummy 
coded ’1’ for firms that were rated but did not receive a positive rating, and Rit is a dummy coded ’1’ 
for years in which a firm was rated by KLD. The statistical difference of the difference in trends was 
determined using a Wald test of the equality β3 = β4 , which yielded F = 20.79, p < .001.  
32
 Following Chatterji & Toffel (2010), I included two interaction terms in my model to facilitate 
interpretation of the regression coefficients. The coefficient on the first interaction term directly tests 
Hypothesis 1. An alternative way of testing the hypothesis would be to include the main effect (KLD 
rated) with one of the interaction terms (e.g. KLD rated X positive rating). In this instance, however, the 
two OLS coefficients must be added together to determine whether the social performance effect of 
positive ratings differed from that of the unrated firms.  
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Yit refers to the charitable contributions of firm i in year t, Xit is a vector of control 
variables, αi is a series of firm-fixed effects, and γit is a series of year dummies. I used 
clustered standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
To test the moderating effects described in Hypotheses 2 and 5, I estimated the 
model shown above with all variables interacted with two dummy variables. For 
example, the model that tests Hypotheses 2 interacts all variables with charitable 
community and non-charitable community. All models tested for significant 
differences between firms initially recognized for their charitable contributions, those 
rated but not recognized, and those not rated. These interactions not only allowed for 
comparisons between subcategories, but also within subcategories.
33
 
Results 
Main Results 
I used STATA to test my models, employing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
with firm-level fixed effects. The efficacy of this research design depended on the 
assumption that the philanthropic contributions of each group of newly rated firms 
would have followed the trend of the unrated firms had KLD not issued their ratings. 
While not directly testable, this assumption would be strengthened if giving trends of 
all groups were found to be similar during the pre-rating period. To test this 
assumption, I compared trends from 1989–1990 across the three groups. Using T-tests, 
I found that differences in the percent change from 1989–1990 in philanthropic 
contributions were statistically insignificant across the three groups—those initially 
rated and recognized, those rated but not initially recognized, and those never rated. 
                                                 
33
 While the interaction models are identical to running separate regressions on split samples, 
interacting both dummy variables (e.g. charitable and non-charitable community) with all other 
variables facilitates the comparison of coefficients.  
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Table 5. Firm response after initial KLD rating 
    1   2 
(A) KLD rated X initial positive rating -0.448 *** 
 
-0.467 *** 
  
(0.096) 
  
(0.123) 
 
(B) KLD rated X no initial positive rating 0.012 
  
-0.006 
 
  
(0.035) 
  
(0.079) 
 
 
Employees (log) -0.025 
  
0.027 
 
  
(0.148) 
  
(0.170) 
 
 
Sales (log) -0.182 
  
-0.293 * 
  
(0.144) 
  
(0.161) 
 
 
Assets (log) 0.211 * 
 
0.212 
 
  
(0.126) 
  
(0.134) 
 
 
Foundation assets (log) 0.086 *** 
 
0.089 *** 
  
(0.033) 
  
(0.032) 
 
 
Return on assets (ROA) -0.012 ** 
 
-0.009 
 
  
(0.005) 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects No 
  
Yes 
 
 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Observations 2,637 
  
2,637 
 
 
Firms 458 
  
458 
 
 
R-squared (within) 0.03 
  
0.05 
 
  Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B) ? 19.95 ***   19.93 *** 
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
Wald test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable. The sample includes newly rated firms and never-rated firms. 
Table 5 presents the results of the models that test Hypothesis 1. In the first 
model, I omit year dummies to estimate the absolute change in contributions between 
the pre- and post-rating periods. The negative coefficient for KLD rated x initial 
positive rating indicates that firms recognized for their charitable giving decreased 
their charitable contributions after being rated.
34
 Nevertheless, because this model 
omitted year dummies, these absolute differences fail to account for changes in 
charitable contributions experienced by the control group of firms that were never 
rated. Thus to account for temporal changes in social norms and policy that affect all 
                                                 
34
 A Wald test indicates that contributions increased significantly more for firms not recognized for 
giving compared to those that were recognized (F = 19.95, p < 0.01).  
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firms in the sample, I include year dummies in the second model. The results of this 
model indicate that firms initially recognized for their charitable contributions reduced 
their charitable contributions by 0.47 percentage points less than firms never rated (β = 
-0.467, p < 0.01), a magnitude equal to approximately one-half of one-standard 
deviation (calculated as β = -0.467 divided by the standard deviation of philanthropic 
contributions = 0.97). A Wald test comparing the coefficients of the two interaction 
terms revealed that firms initially rated superior reduced their contributions more than 
firms that were rated but not recognized for the charitable giving (F = 19.93, p < 0.01). 
Overall, these results strongly support Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Trends in charitable contributions. 
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Table 6. Firm response moderated by charitable community 
    1   2 
(A) Charitable community X KLD rated X initial positive rating  -0.124 
  
-0.124 
 
  
(0.137) 
  
(0.150) 
 
(B) Charitable community X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  -0.100 
  
-0.115 
 
  
(0.062) 
  
(0.094) 
 
 
Charitable community X Employees (log) -0.178 
  
-0.074 
 
  
(0.361) 
  
(0.378) 
 
 
Charitable community X Sales (log) -0.289 
  
-0.473 
 
  
(0.376) 
  
(0.378) 
 
 
Charitable community X Assets (log) 0.526 * 
 
0.537 ** 
  
(0.268) 
  
(0.259) 
 
 
Charitable community X Foundation assets (log) 0.021 
  
0.024 
 
  
(0.104) 
  
(0.104) 
 
 
Charitable community X Return on assets 0.023 
  
0.024 
 
  
(0.017) 
  
(0.017) 
 
(C) Non-charitable community X KLD rated X initial positive rating  -0.519 *** 
 
-0.541 *** 
  
(0.110) 
  
(0.135) 
 
(D) Non-charitable community X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  0.029 
  
0.010 
 
  
(0.038) 
  
(0.081) 
 
 
Non-charitable community X Employees (log) 0.031 
  
0.077 
 
  
(0.135) 
  
(0.159) 
 
 
Non-charitable community X Sales (log) -0.173 
  
-0.275 * 
  
(0.151) 
  
(0.166) 
 
 
Non-charitable community X Assets (log) 0.145 
  
0.142 
 
  
(0.132) 
  
(0.140) 
 
 
Non-charitable community X Foundation assets (log) 0.093 *** 
 
0.097 *** 
  
(0.033) 
  
(0.032) 
 
 
Non-charitable community X Return on assets -0.014 ** 
 
-0.012 ** 
  
(0.006) 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects No 
  
Yes 
 
 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Observations 2,637 
  
2,637 
 
 
Firms 458 
  
458 
 
 
R-squared (within) 0.04 
  
0.06 
 
 
Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)? 0.03 
  
0.00 
  
Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)? 21.75 *** 
 
21.78 *** 
 Wald test: coefficient (A) - (B) = (C) - (D)? 3.40 * 
 
8.32 *** 
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Wald 
test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable. The sample includes newly rated firms and never-rated firms. 
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Figure 2. Trends in contributions by charitable community. 
Table 6 presents the results of the fully interacted model that tests Hypothesis 
2. Again, Column 1 reports results of a model that excludes year dummies. These 
results indicate that only firms that were not recognized for charitable giving and that 
were members of a charitable community experienced absolute increases in their 
contributions from the pre- to post-rating period. The second model, which includes 
year dummies, accounts for the control group’s temporal trends. Here the negative 
statistically significant coefficient on Non-charitable community x KLD rated x initial 
positive rating indicates that firms in non-charitable communities that were recognized 
for their giving practices reduced their contributions by 0.54 percentage points (p < 
0.01), about one-half of one standard deviation (calculated as β = -0.54/SD = 0.97) 
more than did firms in the control group (of firms in charitable communities that were 
never rated). A Wald test comparing the coefficients of the first and second interaction 
term revealed that firms in non-charitable communities that were initially rated 
superior also reduced their contributions to a greater extent than firms in non-
charitable communities that were not recognized for their giving (Wald test F = 21.78, 
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p < 0.01). The insignificance on the first and second interaction terms indicates that 
the effect of an initial positive rating on a firm’s philanthropic contributions is only 
present in non-charitable communities. Overall, the results presented in Table 5 
support Hypothesis 2 (see Figure 2) by indicating that among firms in non-charitable 
communities, those that receive a superior rating will decrease their contributions to a 
greater extent than other firms. 
The results testing Hypothesis 3 are displayed in Table 7. In column 1, we see 
that both firms with either a high (High consumer orientation x KLD rated x initial 
positive rating) or low consumer orientation (Low consumer orientation x KLD rated x 
initial positive rating) decreased their contributions following positive recognition. 
These findings continue to hold even when controlling for the trends of the unrated 
firms (column 2). Comparing the two coefficients using a Wald test revealed that 
neither high (A-B) or low consumer oriented firms (C-D) were more likely to reduce 
their contributions following positive recognition. Thus I find no evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 3 (see Figure 3). 
Table 8 presents the results for Hypothesis 4. Both models provide evidence 
that firms operating in non-socially contested industries were more likely to reduce 
their contributions following positive recognition. In Model 2, The statistically 
negative coefficient on Non-socially contested industry x KLD rated x initial positive 
rating indicates that firms operating in non-socially contested industries that were 
recognized for their giving practices reduced their contributions by 0.54 percentage 
points (p < 0.01), about one-half of one standard deviation (calculated as β = -0.54/SD 
= 0.97) more than did firms in the control group (of firms in non-socially contested 
industries that were never rated). A Wald test comparing the coefficients C and D 
revealed that firms in non-socially contested industries that were initially rated 
positive also reduced their contributions to a greater extent than firms in non-socially 
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contested industries that were not recognized for their giving (F = 23.13, p < 0.01). No 
significant differences were found among firms operating in socially contested 
industries (comparison of coefficients A and B). Overall, the results presented in Table 
8 support Hypothesis 3 (see Figure 4) by indicating that among firms in non-socially 
contested industries, those that receive a positive rating decrease their contributions to 
a greater extent than other firms. 
Finally the results testing Hypothesis 5 are displayed in Table 9. Again, the 
first model suggests that firms with low financial performance that were given a 
positive rating decreased their absolute contributions from the pre- to the post-rated 
period. The full model indicates that among firms with low performance, those that 
were initially recognized for their generous giving reduced their contributions by 0.62 
percentage points more than firms that were never rated, a difference of just under 
two-thirds of one standard deviation (calculated as β = -0.62/SD = 0.97). A Wald test 
reveals that among firms with low performance, those recognized for their generous 
giving reduced their contributions to a greater extent than firms with low performance 
that were not recognized (Wald test F = 19.79, p < 0.01). Furthermore, the difference 
between coefficients A and B was statistically indistinguishable thus providing no 
evidence that managers of firms with high financial performance were more likely to 
reduce their subsequent contributions. The results of Table 9 thus support Hypothesis 
5 (see Figure 5), as they indicate that positive ratings are associated with reductions in 
charitable giving, especially for firms with low financial performance. 
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Table 7. Firm response moderated by consumer orientation 
    1   2 
(A) High consumer orientation X KLD rated X initial positive rating  -0.450 *** 
 
-0.475 *** 
  
(0.105) 
  
(0.128) 
 
(B) High consumer orientation X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  -0.065 * 
 
-0.087 
 
  
(0.039) 
  
(0.082) 
 
 
High consumer orientation X Employees (log) -0.046 
  
0.067 
 
  
(0.178) 
  
(0.186) 
 
 
High consumer orientation X Sales (log) 0.304 ** 
 
0.179 
 
  
(0.139) 
  
(0.144) 
 
 
High consumer orientation X Assets (log) -0.044 
  
-0.076 
 
  
(0.134) 
  
(0.139) 
 
 
High consumer orientation X Foundation assets (log) 0.103 ** 
 
0.116 ** 
  
(0.045) 
  
(0.045) 
 
 
High consumer orientation X Return on assets -0.019 ** 
 
-0.017 * 
  
(0.009) 
  
(0.009) 
 
(C) Low consumer orientation X KLD rated X initial positive rating  -0.459 ** 
 
-0.497 ** 
  
(0.199) 
  
(0.218) 
 
(D) Low consumer orientation X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  0.106 * 
 
0.075 
 
  
(0.057) 
  
(0.090) 
 
 
Low consumer orientation X Employees (log) 0.138 
  
0.149 
 
  
(0.224) 
  
(0.253) 
 
 
Low consumer orientation X Sales (log) -0.831 *** 
 
-0.928 *** 
  
(0.262) 
  
(0.276) 
 
 
Low consumer orientation X Assets (log) 0.481 ** 
 
0.489 ** 
  
(0.221) 
  
(0.223) 
 
 
Low consumer orientation X Foundation assets (log) 0.08 * 
 
0.069 
 
  
(0.048) 
  
(0.047) 
 
 
Low consumer orientation X Return on assets -0.004 
  
-0.001 
 
  
(0.006) 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects No 
  
Yes 
 
 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Observations 2,637 
  
2,637 
 
 
Firms 458 
  
458 
 
 
R-squared (within) 0.05 
  
0.07 
 
 
Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)? 13.01 *** 
 
13.05 *** 
 
Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)? 6.94 *** 
 
7.06 *** 
 Wald test: coefficient (A) - (B) = (C) - (D)? 0.57 
  
0.58 
 
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Wald 
test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable. The sample includes newly rated firms and never-rated firms. 
 75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trends in contributions by consumer orientation. 
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Table 8. Firm response moderated by socially contested industry 
    1   2 
(A) Socially contested industry X KLD rated X initial positive rating  0.094 
  
0.093 
 
  
(0.214) 
  
(0.230) 
 
(B) Socially contested industry X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  0.107 
  
0.097 
 
  
(0.105) 
  
(0.133) 
 
 
Socially contested industry X Employees (log) 0.574 
  
0.607 
 
  
(0.648) 
  
(0.663) 
 
 
Socially contested industry X Sales (log) -0.911 * 
 
-1.141 ** 
  
(0.501) 
  
(0.525) 
 
 
Socially contested industry X Assets (log) 0.038 
  
0.100 
 
  
(0.354) 
  
(0.354) 
 
 
Socially contested industry X Foundation assets (log) -0.003 
  
0.032 
 
  
(0.075) 
  
(0.071) 
 
 
Socially contested industry X Return on assets -0.016 
  
-0.012 
 
  
(0.013) 
  
(0.013) 
 
(C) Non-socially contested industry X KLD rated X initial positive rating  -0.532 *** 
 
-0.543 *** 
  
(0.105) 
  
(0.130) 
 
(D) Non-socially contested industry X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  0.008 
  
0.000 
 
  
(0.037) 
  
(0.080) 
 
 
Non-socially contested industry X Employees (log) -0.057 
  
0.007 
 
  
(0.150) 
  
(0.171) 
 
 
Non-socially contested industry X Sales (log) -0.146 
  
-0.255 
 
  
(0.148) 
  
(0.163) 
 
 
Non-socially contested industry X Assets (log) 0.237 * 
 
0.225 
 
  
(0.133) 
  
(0.138) 
 
 
Non-socially contested industry X Foundation assets (log) 0.102 *** 
 
0.100 *** 
  
(0.036) 
  
(0.036) 
 
 
Non-socially contested industry X Return on assets -0.011 * 
 
-0.008 
 
  
(0.006) 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
Year Fixed Effects No 
  
Yes 
 
 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Yes 
 
 
Observations 2,637 
  
2,637 
 
 
Firms 458 
  
458 
 
 
R-squared (within) 0.04 
  
0.06 
 
 
Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)? 0.00 
  
0.00 
  
Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)? 23.12 *** 
 
23.13 *** 
 Wald test: coefficient (A) - (B) = (C) - (D)? 4.62 ** 
 
4.77 ** 
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Wald 
test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable. The sample includes newly rated firms and never-rated firms. 
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Figure 4. Trends in contributions by socially contested industry. 
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Table 9. Firm response moderated by prior financial performance 
  1   2 
High-performance firm X KLD rated X initial positive rating  -0.179 
  
-0.195 
 
 
(0.167) 
  
(0.182) 
 
High-performance firm X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  0.058 
  
0.038 
 
 
(0.037) 
  
(0.079) 
 
High-performance firm X Employees (log) 0.056 
  
0.113 
 
 
(0.239) 
  
(0.248) 
 
High-performance firm X Sales (log) -0.161 
  
-0.303 * 
 
(0.150) 
  
(0.161) 
 
High-performance firm X Assets (log) 0.078 
  
0.096 
 
 
(0.154) 
  
(0.173) 
 
High-performance firm X Foundation assets (log) 0.039 
  
0.044 
 
 
(0.039) 
  
(0.038) 
 
High-performance firm X Return on assets 0.001 
  
0.003 
 
 
(0.007) 
  
(0.007) 
 
Low-performance firm X KLD rated X initial positive rating  -0.594 *** 
 
-0.621 *** 
 
(0.111) 
  
(0.137) 
 
Low-performance firm X KLD rated X no initial positive rating  -0.037 
  
-0.061 
 
 
(0.057) 
  
(0.094) 
 
Low-performance firm X Employees (log) -0.089 
  
-0.032 
 
 
(0.187) 
  
(0.205) 
 
Low-performance firm X Sales (log) -0.252 
  
-0.353 
 
 
(0.207) 
  
(0.223) 
 
Low-performance firm X Assets (log) 0.346 * 
 
0.323 * 
 
(0.184) 
  
(0.181) 
 
Low-performance firm X Foundation assets (log) 0.108 ** 
 
0.110 ** 
 
(0.048) 
  
(0.048) 
 
Low-performance firm X Return on assets -0.02 *** 
 
-0.016 ** 
 
(0.007) 
  
(0.007) 
 
Year Fixed Effects No 
  
Yes 
 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes 
  
Yes 
 Observations 2,637 
  
2,637 
 Firms 458 
  
458 
 R-squared (within) 0.04 
  
0.06 
 
Wald test: coefficient (A) = (B)? 1.76 
  
1.72 
 
Wald test: coefficient (C) = (D)? 19.88 *** 
 
19.79 *** 
Wald test: coefficient (A) - (B) = (C) - (D)? 2.16 
  
2.23 
 
OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Wald 
test displays F test statistic where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable. The sample includes newly rated firms and never-rated firms. 
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Figure 5. Trends in contributions by prior financial performance. 
Robustness Tests 
Although the findings are broadly consistent with my main theoretical arguments, 
there are indeed alternative explanations. Most threatening is the concern that the 
observed reduction in contributions for recognized firms may simply be due to 
regression to the mean. This argument is particularly relevant if we assume the 
possibility that contributions may drop for purely stochastic rather than behavioral 
reasons (Bothner, Kim, & Smith, 2012).
35
 To thus rule out the possibility of mean 
reversion, I estimated a dynamic model that included a lagged dependent variable to 
control for prior levels of giving. Using a lagged dependent variable with firm fixed-
effects can be problematic, however, as error term will almost certainly be correlated 
with the lagged-dependent variable which can lead to inconsistent estimates (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). To overcome this problem, 
                                                 
35
 For example, it could very well be that firms randomly gave at higher levels in the years preceding 
the rating and were consequently recognized as a charitable organization by KLD. If this were indeed 
the case, subsequent reductions could be considered random fluctuations rather than actual responses. 
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I used a model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which relies on lagged values 
of the dependent variable to act as instruments for changes in contributions. Results 
using this alternative specification were still consistent with the findings from the 
main analysis, thus providing robust support for Hypothesis 1. 
Another way to rule out mean reversion would be to run a falsification test 
during the pre-treatment period. Such a test would entail assigning each firm a false 
year in which the rating period began and re-estimating the main difference-in-
differences model during the years 1986 to 1991. To carry out this evaluation, I thus 
assumed that the ratings that were ultimately given by KLD in 1991, were actually 
assigned in the year 1988. The results for this alternative specification revealed that 
over this time period, firms that ultimately received a positive rating maintained 
similar trends in the corporate contributions when compared to the control group of 
firms (unrated) and the firms that were ultimately rated but not recognized.
36
 Viewing 
these results alongside the main results, I thus conclude that firms that ultimately 
received a positive rating by KLD maintained consistently high levels of giving during 
the pre-rating period, and then responded to the rating in 1991 by reducing their 
subsequent contributions (see Figure 1). Combined with the earlier results that 
controlled for prior levels of giving, these findings thus lead me to believe that my 
results are not being driven by mean reversion. 
I also performed robustness tests to evaluate the extent to which my results 
were sensitive to alternative measures of the dependent variable. First, I considered an 
alternative measure of charitable giving. Although contributions as a percentage of 
pre-tax profits has historically been the most commonly used measure within the 
corporate community when establishing annual contributions budgets (Lydenberg et 
                                                 
36
 If the findings in my main analysis were indeed driven by random fluctuations, I would have likely 
found similar reductions in the pre-rating period. Such findings would cast doubt on my main argument 
that subsequent reductions following recognition were an actual response to the ratings. 
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al., 1986), recent surveys suggest that changes in giving may be better connected with 
changes in revenue, not changes in pre-tax profit, as is generally assumed (Coady, 
2009). Thus one alternative measure of corporate philanthropy could be the total 
amount of philanthropic contributions scaled by revenue rather than pre-tax profits. 
Another commonly used measure within the literature is the total amount of 
philanthropic contributions (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; Galaskiewicz, 1985, 
1997; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Marquis & Lee, 
2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
37
 To thus test the sensitivity of the results to these 
various measures of corporate giving, I reran the main-effects model shown in Table 5 
using the total philanthropic contributions scaled by revenue and the total 
philanthropic contributions (logged). Results using both alternative measures were not 
substantively different than those obtained in the main analysis. 
Summary 
In summary, I found strong support for my primary hypothesis that recognition as a 
charitable organization could lead exceptionally generous firms to reduce their 
subsequent contributions more than other firms. As shown in Table 10, firms that were 
rated and recognized as a charitable organization, on average, decreased their 
subsequent contributions by 0.47 percentage points from 1.97 to 1.50. No substantive 
change was found for firms that were rated but not recognized by KLD. 
                                                 
37
 This measure is generally transformed using a log-transformation to reduce the influence of outliers.  
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Table 10. Pre- and post-rating trends for rated and recognized firms 
  
Pre-rating 
contributions 
(1989–1991) 
 
Post-rating 
contributions 
(1992–1994) 
 
Number of 
firms 
Firms rated by KLD: 
     
 
KLD rated X initial positive rating 1.97  1.50  56 
 KLD rated X no initial positive rating 0.85   0.88   297 
Firms rated and recognized by KLD:      
 
Charitable community 1.93  1.82  10 
 
Non-charitable community 1.98  1.43  46 
 
High consumer orientation 1.86  1.40  37 
 
Low consumer orientation 2.19  1.68  19 
 
Socially contested industry 1.70  1.62  10 
 
Non-socially contested industry 2.03  1.47  46 
 
High-performance firm 1.69  1.50  19 
  Low-performance firm 2.11   1.50   37 
 
I also found strong support for most of the hypothesized moderating effects. 
Firms headquartered in charitable communities, such as Boeing (headquartered in 
Seattle) and Honeywell (headquartered in Minneapolis), were much less likely to 
decrease their contributions following positive recognition, presumably because these 
firms face substantial normative pressures to maintain high levels of philanthropic 
giving. Firms operating in socially contested sectors, such as Seagram (alcohol) and 
UST (tobacco), were also less likely to decrease their contributions following positive 
recognition, seemingly because the inherent reputational risks associated with their 
business activities require higher levels of “insurance-like” protection afforded by 
charitable contributions. 
Finally, recognition as a charitable organization did not appear to substantively 
influence subsequent contributions for firms whose past financial performance was 
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high, presumably because past financial success leads to strategic persistence. For 
firms whose past financial performance was low, however, such recognition likely 
triggered sequential attention mechanisms, which led such firms to refocus their 
attention and resources towards firm profitability goals, and thus reduce their 
subsequent contributions. 
Contrary to my prediction, I found no evidence for a moderating effect of 
consumer orientation on firm response to being rated as a charitable organization. 
Although somewhat surprising, this lack of evidence is consistent with Galaskiewicz’s 
(1985, 1997) previous finding that dependence on consumer sales is not a consistent 
predictor of philanthropic behaviors. One explanation for this lack of support may be 
due to the measure itself rather than the underlying theory. Indeed, this hypothesis was 
originally motivated by the assertion that reputation-sensitive firms would be more 
concerned about the perceived loss of reputation associated with reductions in 
contributions. In this study, however, reputational sensitivity was operationalized 
using a coarse-grained industry classification, rather than a firm’s individual 
reputation. Given this disconnect between theory and data, it could very well be that 
positive results could be obtained by using data that more directly assessed 
reputational sensitivity at the firm rather than industry level. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I have argued that positive ratings could ironically lead firms to 
reduce their subsequent performance. Drawing upon the tenets of behavioral theory 
and performance feedback theory (Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & March, 1963; 
Gavetti et al., 2012; Greve, 2003b), I proposed that positive ratings could lead firms 
whose prior performance exceeds the threshold to perceive the new performance 
standard as a satisfactory and acceptable goal. Such changes in perceptions could lead 
high-performing firms to redefine their aspirations and thus reduce their subsequent 
performance. 
I tested this premise by examining how being rated as a charitable organization 
influenced a firm’s subsequent level of philanthropic contributions. I found that firms 
that met the performance threshold established by the rating agency were more likely 
to decrease their subsequent contributions than other firms. Such reductions, however, 
were less likely to occur for firms located in communities with strong normative 
pressures that favor corporate involvement in the community as well as for firms with 
higher levels of industry-specific risk, such as those operating in socially contested 
industries. I also found that subsequent reductions were particularly likely among 
firms whose prior financial performance was below their peers. 
Together, these findings extend scholarly work by redefining our 
understanding about the performance effects of positive ratings and by theoretically 
expanding the ways in which organizational aspirations are formed. For scholars and 
practitioners interested in corporate responsibility, these findings also demonstrate that 
there are certain risks associated with recognizing responsibility; that efforts to 
promote increased social performance can paradoxically lead to reductions in social 
performance. 
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Firm Response to Positive Ratings 
The primary contribution of this study speaks to a recent body of literature that 
examines the impact of ratings on rated organizations (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; 
Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Jin & Leslie, 2003; Martins, 
2005). A common theme among these studies is poorly rated firms tend to improve. In 
this study, I extend this growing body of research by examining the performance 
effects of positive ratings. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that positive 
ratings that recognize firms for their past performance can ironically lead these same 
firms to reduce their subsequent performance. This finding is important from a 
theoretical and practical perspective as both organizational scholars and practitioners 
have implicitly assumed that the use of positive recognition as a reward is indeed an 
effective way to drive improvements in subsequent behavior and performance 
(Fombrun, 1996; Sadowski et al., 2010; Waddock et al., 2000). 
My findings also contribute to the literature on the performance effects of 
ratings by demonstrating that firm response to positive recognition can be moderated 
by institutional and organizational characteristics. Indeed, previous work has 
established that regulatory environments and firms’ efficiency levels can moderate 
firm response to ratings (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). I extend this literature by 
examining how other contingency factors, including local communities (Marquis & 
Battilana, 2009; Marquis et al., 2007), industry-specific risk (Brammer & Pavelin, 
2005; Godfrey, 2005; Koh et al., 2013), and prior financial performance, moderate 
firm response. Such factors are of theoretical value because they help scholars to 
better understand how and when positive ratings will lead to reductions in 
performance. 
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Ratings as Source of Performance Feedback 
This study also contributes to the behavioral and performance feedback literature by 
theoretically expanding the ways in which aspiration levels are formed. Extant 
research suggests that aspiration levels are typically based on the firm’s historical 
performance and the performance of similar others (Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & 
March, 1963; Greve, 1998). While scholars have certainly acknowledged that third-
party ratings can indirectly alter aspirations by providing information that facilitates 
social comparison (Greve, 2003b), limited attention has been paid to the direct 
feedback that institutional elements, such as ratings, provide (Gavetti et al., 2012; 
Gavetti et al., 2007; Shinkle, 2012). In this study, I thus extend behavioral theory by 
proposing that ratings can serve as a direct source of performance feedback to which 
firms respond. By redefining standards of appropriate and acceptable behavior, such 
ratings can lead high-performing firms to lower their aspirations and thus reduce their 
subsequent performance. 
Limitations and Future Research 
While I am confident in the results of my study, I acknowledge a number of 
limitations and suggest some areas of future research. Central to my main argument 
was the assertion that positive ratings could lead firms to reduce their subsequent 
contributions by reducing uncertainty regarding the standards of appropriate and 
acceptable giving. Under the assumption that firms would seek to avoid uncertainty, I 
maintained that the introduction of a new performance standard could lead high-
performing firms to perceive the standard as an acceptable and satisfactory goal and 
thus lead them to reduce their performance. While the results of this study are 
consistent with this argument, I was unable to test this mechanism directly as the 
process by which aspirations are formed and determined are largely unobservable in 
 87 
large archival studies. Experimental methods using a similar context could therefore 
be used to test whether managerial aspirations are indeed influenced by positive 
ratings. 
Although the main focus of the study was on the performance effects of 
positive ratings, I was also somewhat surprised to find that firms that were not 
recognized for giving showed little to no change in contributions relative to the control 
group. Because prior research has found that firms respond to negative ratings 
(Chatterji & Toffel, 2010), it would have been reasonable to expect that firms that 
were unrecognized might increase the level of their contributions in subsequent years. 
Such results would have been consistent with KLD’s belief that the reputation and 
status associated with positive recognition would motivate the unrecognized firms to 
improve (see Appendix B). 
On the other hand, there are at least three compelling reasons why firms with 
lower levels of charitable giving were unresponsive to the ratings. First, scholars have 
argued that corporate philanthropy (which is subsumed under the broader construct of 
corporate responsibility) is better understood as one dimension of corporate strategy 
and that firms will choose different levels of giving depending on the risk and 
opportunities they face (Vogel, 2005). Given this argument, it is therefore plausible 
that low-performing firms were unresponsive to the ratings simply because they did 
not view philanthropy as essential to the strategic purposes of their firm. The fact that 
these firms give at all might be better explained by institutional mechanisms such as 
decoupling or symbolic compliance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). Second, 
even if the unrecognized firms desired to increase their subsequent contributions, such 
increases could have been difficult to achieve in the short run due to the highly 
institutionalized nature of corporate giving (e.g. foundations, corporate giving 
programs, etc.). Finally, research on human perception suggests that there is 
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significant asymmetry between the cognitive processing of positive and negative 
events, with bad being much stronger than good (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). For example, one might expect that being recognized as a 
selfish organization might generate a stronger response than being unrecognized as a 
charitable organization. Given these arguments, low-performing firms that were not 
recognized as a charitable organization might have been unresponsive simply because 
being unrecognized does not stimulate response to the same degree as being 
recognized for something that is negative or undesirable. 
One of the primary assumptions of this paper is that most public corporations 
engage in philanthropy as a means to secure their reputation among their peers and 
community. Although this assumption may hold true for the majority, I grant that a 
number of firms may be motivated for more altruistic reasons, whether it be a sense of 
moral obligation and duty (Logsdon & Wood, 2002; Wood & Logsdon, 2002), or as 
part of their organizational identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Target, for example, 
has been giving 5 percent of its pretax profits to local communities since 1946. Firms 
like Target, which have strong philanthropic identities, may be less likely to satisfice 
after being rated as a charitable organization. Future research could thus extend these 
findings by examining how such identity and commitment moderate firm responses to 
positive ratings. 
Because the hypotheses were tested in a very specific context, an important 
question to consider is whether performance reductions following positive recognition 
would be found in other empirical settings. As noted in Chapter 4, one particular 
important assertion in my main premise is that firms lack a general knowledge about 
the consequences of philanthropy, and that this lack of knowledge leads to substantial 
uncertainty regarding how much they should give. Such uncertainty, I argued, was a 
key factor in driving high-performing firms to reduce their subsequent contributions. 
 89 
Following this logic, the presence of uncertainty in decision-making may therefore be 
a necessary condition for firms to reduce their subsequent performance following 
positive recognition. Future research could therefore extend this work by examining 
how firms respond to positive ratings in situations with less uncertainty. 
Another important aspect of the empirical context was that the rating defined a 
specific performance threshold. Such specificity, I argued, was a driving factor in 
reducing uncertainty about how much firms should give. Not all ratings, however, 
define specific performance thresholds. In fact, some rating agencies may deliberately 
prefer ambiguous standards as it enables them to maintain power and control over the 
rating process (Graffin & Ward, 2010).
38
 Because firms seek to avoid uncertainty by 
following decision rules (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012), it then follows 
that having a rating that defines a specific performance standard may also be a 
necessary condition for firms to reduce their subsequent performance following 
positive recognition. Future research could therefore extend this work by examining 
how firms respond to positive ratings that do not define specific performance 
standards. 
The Paradox of Recognizing Responsibility 
Stakeholders interested in corporate responsibility have often used ratings as a means 
to increase transparency and reduce information asymmetry (Chatterji & Levine, 
2006; Chatterji et al., 2009). Implied in this pursuit is the idea that recognizing good 
behavior can motivate corporations to maintain or increase their level of corporate 
responsibility. Nevertheless, because such ratings influence the decision-making 
                                                 
38
 For example, Graffin and Ward noted that if standards “for being ‘green’ or ‘socially responsible’ 
were clear and quantifiable, such interest groups would quickly lose influence as meeting a particular 
standard would simply amount to checking off ‘green practices.’ As such, it may behoove such 
organizations to make sure that their standards remain uncertain” (2010, p. 343).  
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processes of managers, they do impose hidden risks. In this study, I show that efforts 
to promote corporate responsibility through recognition and rewards can paradoxically 
lead to reductions in social performance. Such findings are theoretically relevant 
because they provide some insight as to why we continue to see acts of corporate 
irresponsibility even as efforts to motivate socially responsible behavior increase. 
From a policy perspective, these findings also suggest that there may be 
unintended consequences when rewarding responsibility. Ironically, efforts to promote 
responsible corporate behavior may prove to be unhelpful or even harmful. I do not 
mean to suggest that such efforts are useless, only that the potential negative effects 
need to be taken into consideration. While much more research is needed, given what 
we know about the efficacy of negative ratings, these findings suggest that policy 
makers and stakeholders who have an interest in motivating increased corporate 
responsibility may want to focus on singling out the poor performers rather than 
recognizing the good. 
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APPENDIX A: ACADEMIC STUDIES USING THE KLD RATINGS 
Widely used in the subfields of stakeholder management and corporate social 
responsibility (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003), the KLD ratings been have utilized in number of academic 
articles. To systematically analyze the ways in which the ratings have been used, I 
undertook a review of all published empirical articles that have utilized the KLD 
ratings as a primary independent or dependent variable from 1991, when the ratings 
were first issue, to May 2013. 
Specifically, I used the EBSCO database Business Source Complete and 
searched for peer-reviewed articles that referenced the KLD ratings in the following 
top journals: Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Administrative Science 
Quarterly (ASQ), Organization Science (OS), and the Strategic Management Journal 
(SMJ). I also included two specialty journals, Business & Society (B&S) and Journal 
of Business Ethics (JBE), two management journals that have historically published 
articles on issues surrounding corporate social responsibility. Using the search term 
“KLD” or “Kinder Lydenberg Domini,” I found 218 articles that referenced the KLD 
ratings in the text. After reviewing each article, I then removed those that did include 
the KLD ratings as an independent or dependent variable. Many of these articles only 
mentioned the dataset in passing reference. Others were theoretical articles that did not 
perform an empirical analysis. A handful of articles also sought to validate the KLD 
data with other types of CSR proxies, but did explicitly use ratings to test hypotheses. 
Following this screening process, I obtained 84 empirical articles that directly utilized 
the KLD ratings in their analysis. 
As shown in Figure A.1, the first article to use the KLD ratings was published 
in 1994, three years after the ratings were first issued. The number of articles 
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published per year using the KLD data, has risen slowly, but steadily over the years, 
with a maximum of 13 in 2011.
39
 Also interesting to note, is the timing of publication 
by journals (see Table A.1). From 1994 to 2005, AMJ (25%) and B&S (50%) 
published the majority of articles using the KLD dataset, perhaps reflecting their 
prominence as some of the leading theoretical and specialty journals in the field 
respectively. Since 2005, however, the majority of articles using KLD data in their 
analysis have been published in SMJ (27%) and JBE (59%). While these shifts in 
publications trends for work using the KLD data could very well correspond with 
lower perceived prestige of the two journals, they could also be indicative of increased 
interest in the strategic and ethical implications of corporate social and environmental 
performance. 
 
Figure A.1. Academic articles using the KLD data. 
  
                                                 
39
 Although 2011 marks the high-water year for the publication of articles using the KLD dataset, 2013 
will likely surpass this level as 12 articles have already been published in the first 5 months of the year.  
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Table A.1. Distribution of articles by journal and time 
Journal 
All 
(n = 84) 
 
1994–2005 
(n = 20) 
 
2006–Present 
(n = 64) 
Administrative Science Quarterly 2%  0%  3% 
Academy of Management Journal 7%  25%  2% 
Business & Society 19%  50%  9% 
Organization Science 0%  0%  0% 
Strategic Management Journal 24%  15%  27% 
Journal of Business Ethics 48%   10%   59% 
 
The articles differed on several dimensions, including the level at which the 
ratings were aggregated and whether ratings were used as an independent or 
dependent variable. As displayed in Table A.2, Panel A, approximately one-third of 
the articles simply summed the strength and concerns indicators to create a composite 
CSP or CSR index (Hillman & Keim, 2001). While some scholars have been critical 
of this approach (Godfrey et al., 2009; Mattingly & Berman, 2006), this type of 
aggregation is useful in that it allows researchers to easily compare overall CSP across 
a large number of firms. The remaining two-thirds have used the ratings in a 
disaggregated form, divided by strengths and concerns, by individual categories (e.g. 
environment, community, diversity, etc.), or by individual items. In contrast to 
aggregation, the disaggregation approach allows researchers to examine more nuanced 
questions regarding the antecedents and consequences of various dimensions CSP and 
the degree to which firms differentially attend to various stakeholder groups. 
Of all the studies that have used the ratings as a primary explanatory variable 
(IV), more than half (53%) sought to determine the relationship between corporate 
social performance (whether broad or specific dimensions) and some measure of 
financial performance or risk (e.g. return on assets, revenue growth, Tobin’s Q, 
abnormal returns, cost of capital, etc.) (see Table A.2, Panel B). Indeed, as noted by 
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Margolis and Walsh (2003, p. 273), such patterns “reflect the enduring quest to find a 
persuasive business case for social initiatives.” Other common outcomes of interest 
included ESG performance (e.g. release of toxic emissions, the likelihood of corporate 
donations, and executive compensation), corporate reputation (e.g. quality of 
management, attractiveness to employees, etc.), and the level and quality of 
disclosure. 
Table A.2. Variation in studies using the KLD ratings 
Panel A. Article breakdown by variable status and level of aggregation 
 
Level of Aggregation 
Variable Status Aggregated Disaggregated 
Dependent Variable 10 (12%)* 21 (25%) 
Independent Variable 18 (21%) 35 (42%) 
*Count (Percentage) 
    
     Panel B. Studies using the KLD ratings as an independent variable  
Dependent Variable Count Percentage 
Financial performance 28 53% 
ESG Performance 11 21% 
Reputation 6 11% 
Disclosure 5 9% 
Other 3 6%  
Total 53 100% 
 
Despite KLD’s interest in increasing corporate accountability (Gumbel, 1991), 
only one article directly examined the performance consequences of the ratings. 
Focusing their efforts on corporate environmental performance, Chatterji and Toffel 
(2010) found that firms that initially received poor environmental ratings subsequently 
reduced their release of toxic emissions compared to other firms. Because their 
research design relied upon an exogenous shock that occurred when KLD expanded 
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the scope its ratings in 2001, Chatterji and Toffel were able to examine changes in 
emission behaviors before and after being rated. While ten other studies used the 
ratings to predict various dimensions of corporate social performance, none of these 
employed a research design (i.e. pre and post measures with a control group), that 
would mitigate the threat of selection bias and thus allow the researcher to evaluate 
whether the firms do indeed respond to ratings. 
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APPENDIX B: PHONE INTERVIEW WITH STEVEN LYDENBERG, CO-
FOUNDER OF KLD, DECEMBER 18, 2012 
Lydenberg: This is Steven 
Lewis: Hi Steven this is Ben Lewis from Cornell 
Lydenberg: Hi Ben how are you doing? 
Lewis: Good, is now a good time? 
Lydenberg: It’s an excellent time. 
Lewis: Alright. Well I appreciate your willingness to talk to me today. This will be a 
great help to my dissertation. Did you receive my email that I sent yesterday? 
Lydenberg: No I don’t think I did. 
Lewis: Okay, no worries. I just sent a list of questions that I thought might help frame 
our discussion. But just to provide a little bit of background, the study that I am 
proposing is similar to Mike Toffel’s work where they look at the performance effects 
of the KLD ratings. They, if I recall correctly, were specifically focused on the 
environmental ratings and what they found was that firms that received poor ratings 
were more likely to improve their environmental performance over time. The question 
that I am looking at is very closely related but I am looking at the effects of positive 
ratings, that is, how do firms respond to being recognized? Rather than being singled 
out as poor performers, how do they respond when they are recognized as superior 
performers? The particular rating that I am actually looking at is the charitable giving 
rating which is given to firms that have given at least 1.5% of net earnings before 
taxes to charity. In my study, I look at how firms respond to being recognized and 
rated as a charitable organization. So that’s where I am coming from. I just have a 
couple of questions broadly speaking about the ratings in general. I was wondering if 
we could go through them. Is that okay? 
Lydenberg: Sure with the understanding that I was involved with KLD from 1990–
2001. 
Lewis: It’s been a while I understand. If you can’t recall that’s totally fine. Now . . . as 
I presented my research to other people, one of the questions that keeps coming up is 
“What is the primary purpose or objective of KLD ratings?” Some of the statements 
that I read about the purposes of the ratings revolve around the idea of increasing 
transparency and providing information to investors who care about these issues. But I 
was also wondering to what extent were the ratings issued as a way to motivate 
companies to improve? When I talk about this with others, they seem to be skeptical 
and say “well it seems like they are just providing information, they don’t really care 
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about the consequences.” But based on what I have read, both your work and that of 
Amy and Peter, it seems as if your objective goes beyond just providing information 
and you actually care about the consequences of these ratings. I wondered if you could 
comment on that. 
Lydenberg: I think that is essentially accurate. We approach this from a slightly 
different angle which is from the investor’s perspective rather than the company and 
manager’s perspective. We had two primary objectives when it began. One was the 
creation of the Domini Index and the other was the database and we were very explicit 
about the purposes of the index. There were 3 purposes of the index. Let me see if I 
can recall them now. One was to test the proposition that screening companies, setting 
standards for companies did not necessarily harm performance. The index was set up 
so that it matched exactly the methodology for maintaining the S&P 500 index, so 
those two indexes could be compared over time. The second purpose was to provide 
investors with a set of companies that were investable form a socially environmental 
point of view and the third was to create a financial product that people could invest 
in. The profiles of the companies, that is, the ratings of the companies, were made in 
creating the index to help us understand all of the profiles of the companies. The 
ratings were also used by money managers who had clients interested in social 
investing. Because social investors come in all shapes and sizes, that is to say they’ve 
got a variety of different concerns, we allowed the money managers to use our data in 
a variety of ways that would serve different clients with different social thresholds. 
That’s why we didn’t give absolute ratings to companies. In the initial years, we just 
gave indications of strengths and concern in a variety of different areas. Implicit in all 
that but not explicit is the thought that investors should invest in companies that have 
stronger records and that presumably companies should want to attract these investors 
and perform well and improve their performance. That was implicit in everything that 
we did but it was coming from an investors point of view so it was not quite as 
explicit. 
Lewis: Okay, that’s what I presumed. When I’ve read statements about the objectives 
of the KLD ratings, it was often, exactly as you mentioned, to provide information. 
However, in your book about driving a corporate interest or driving corporations 
toward public interest, it seems as if implicit in all of this work is this idea that 
providing this information will lead companies to improve their social and 
environmental performance. 
Lydenberg: Yes, I have no problem with that it is implicit in everything that we do. 
Lewis: Great. It’s nice to have that confirmation then. Moving on. So . . . the way that 
my study is designed, I look at how firms respond when the ratings were first issued in 
1991. One of the questions that I get on this study is “How do you know that 
companies really cared about their ratings?” Do we have any evidence that they 
actually did respond? I tried to find some media articles and from what I could tell a 
number of companies would issue a press release when they were included on the 
index. I was just wondering if you have any anecdotal evidence or stories that you 
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could tell about whether firms actually did care about their ratings and whether they 
did respond to them. 
Lydenberg: I can’t give you a definitive answer on that but here are some facts that 
may be helpful to you. In the process of profiling a company we updated these profiles 
every year. We sent our profiles to every company for review and comment. So we 
know as a fact that every company at least had the theoretical ability to be aware of 
their profile and what we were saying about them. 
Lewis: But you could also say that some of them didn’t care, right and they probably 
just ignored the letter, right? 
Lydenberg: We didn’t do an actual count of those companies that responded but I am 
going to say that it was in the 10% range that provided us with additional information, 
they commented on our report or something like that. 
Lewis: Okay, and for these companies that responded, how did they react? Were they 
upset? When they were providing information was it often to help them be perceived 
in a better light? 
Lydenberg: We asked them for factual corrections and additional information. They 
provided both. Different companies responded at different levels. A lot of the larger 
companies would send us factual material and some of them would send us simply 
comments on a range of things. I can only recall one time when a company threatened 
to sue us if we published that information. On the whole I would say that the ones that 
did respond did so in a cooperative spirit. 
Lewis: Now, I know the ratings that you issued were based on annual profiles, but 
were they done at the end of the calendar year or were they done throughout the year 
and then just updated as information came along? I’m just wondering about the timing 
of the ratings. 
Lydenberg: We had a rolling profile schedule. We were continually profiling 
companies, the same companies at the same time of the year every year, working our 
way through what was originally 650 companies. Later it was more. All companies 
were profiled once a year but on a rolling basis. Then we in effect did what we called 
“freezing the database.” Once a year we froze the ratings to provide an annual 
snapshot of corporate social performance. 
Lewis: That’s why I imagine the ratings I have, the binary, the zeroes and ones. 
Lydenberg: Yeah. 
Lewis: That makes sense. Now, a number of the ratings are more specific; for 
example, the charitable giving ratings specifies a performance threshold that 
companies should meet in order to receive the rating, but others are somewhat to very 
ambiguous. How are the criteria for these ratings determined? 
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Lydenberg: We had three criteria. One was that we could obtain the information 
essentially without cooperation from the company. The cooperation of the company 
was helpful, but if the company didn’t cooperate we would at least have some basic 
information so that meant that we felt that we had at least fairly decent information for 
every company on every issue. The second criterion was that to a maximum degree it 
should be quantifiable but we recognized that some of the issues were inherently 
qualitative but we tried to a maximum degree to get quantifiable issues. The third 
criterion was that it was meaningful; that is to say, there is a lot of information out 
there that is quantifiable but we wouldn’t know what to make of it in terms of its 
meaning. The example that I gave then was that there was very good information 
about companies’ contributions to election campaigns but what exactly it meant was 
not clear. Although we gathered that information because it was quantifiable and 
available for all companies, we didn’t feel that it resulted in a meaningful positive or 
negative gamut of interpretation. Those are our three criteria for data points that we 
gathered. 
Lewis: Okay, I am going to shift a little bit and talk more specifically about the 
charitable giving rating. Certainly charitable giving can be assessed without 
cooperation from the company. I think it meets those three criteria that you just 
mentioned but, I was just wondering why the 1.5% threshold, was there a particular 
reason? 
Lydenberg: A general goal for the threshold in the strength and concern indicators 
was that they captured between 10–20% of the companies. We were looking for 
indicators where the strength was meaningful, in the sense that it only 10–20% of the 
companies would actually achieve the positive rating. Sometimes that worked better 
than others. For example, back in 1990, we had a strength and concern on CEO 
compensation. The concern was set at $5 million and any CEO that received 
compensation of more than $5 million would receive a negative rating for CEO 
compensation. Back in 1990, anywhere from 10–20% of the companies received that 
rating. By the mid-’90s, that percentage was more like 30–40% so we increased the 
threshold for inclusion up to $10 million. That was our way of setting thresholds. 
Lewis: That makes sense. When you look at the ratings from 1991, of the 650 
companies that were rated, I believe it was about 75 that received that charitable 
giving rating so that was just over 10%. Did you have a hope specifically that firms 
that did not receive the positive rating would then increase their level of contributions? 
Lydenberg: Implicitly but not explicitly. 
Lewis: Do you remember what data sources did you use to assess the charitable giving 
rating? 
Lydenberg: We had a variety of sources of information published on charitable 
giving by companies in addition to the companies themselves. I believe it was 
Corporate Philanthropy Magazine or Newsletter that issued a yearly assessment of 
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companies or something like that. There was some kind of yearly publications that 
gave dollar figures for philanthropy in addition to the filings for corporate foundations. 
Data for those companies were available through the foundation library in Boston. 
Lewis: One more question that I had is how you deal with conflicting information. 
Sometimes there is conflicting information between the two different sources and most 
of the time they are the same but sometimes they’re different. How would you resolve 
a discrepancy if one source says something and the other source says something else? 
Lydenberg: Right. There are a variety of different methodological issues that we 
came up. One of them is whether to count in-kind contributions and my memory is, if 
it serves me correctly, that it did not include in-kind contributions in that number. We 
looked to the first and foremost corporations for the number. When you couldn’t get 
that, we turned to secondary sources. I don’t remember if we had conflicts between the 
Taft directory and the National Corporate Giving Directory. How we resolved that, I 
don’t remember. 
Lewis: Okay. 
Lydenberg: Just one more thing. There were further complications when what do you 
do with a company who has a loss one year so we had a variety of ways of dealing 
with those I think we tried to normalize the earnings in some kind of way. 
Lewis: Okay. One thing that would be helpful for me is to use the same sources of 
information that you guys were using. I was wondering if there was anywhere where I 
could actually obtain that specific information that you used when deciding the rating 
for a given company. For example, I’ve seen a company profile for GE where it 
specifically stated that GE gave 1.6% of profits to charity in 1991. Based on what I’ve 
read, it seems as if KLD issued not just ratings but actual reviews about the companies 
and I just haven’t been able to find them anywhere. 
Lydenberg: Right. To access those reviews, you would have to go back to the KLD 
files for that. Right now the KLD files are currently in storage. I am currently engaged 
in a conversation with KLD, MSCI, and the Business School Library over at Harvard 
Business School about getting those files taken out of storage and made available to 
academics. So you’d have to go back and look at the individual folders and the backup 
materials to find out exactly where we got our information. 
Lewis: I know KLD was bought out by MSCI now. Is that something they would be 
willing to let academic researchers access or is it bureaucratic? 
Lydenberg: You’d have to contact them to find out. They’re in storage somewhere. I 
really have no idea where they are and how easy it would be to actually find the files. 
Lewis: That would certainly make my life a lot easier. They have the Socrates 
database where currently I can look and find similar reviews on companies but they’re 
not historical in the sense that they only give the current snapshot. 
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Lydenberg: We probably did save the ratings every year. I don’t believe we saved the 
actual database. I don’t believe there’s one place together where you can get all of 
profiles from 1990–1993. You’d have to go to the specific companies to get those and 
even those it’s a little hard to imagine how you’d get to them. 
Lewis: What you’re saying then is that MSCI doesn’t have the files on hand. Is that 
correct? 
Lydenberg: Actually, I’m not sure what happened to the paper files. We used paper 
files starting in 1990 through I’m going to say about 1997, 1998. Then things started 
to switch over to electronic. But the paper files should all be in storage, they all exist. 
At least I think they do. 
Lewis: If somehow I could get access to them that would be great. 
Lydenberg: Right. Again, we debated at various points whether or not every item on 
the profile should be footnoted and we decided it was simply too much work. 
Lewis: You said you’re currently working with the Harvard Business School to make 
those files available to the public, correct? 
Lydenberg: Well, there’s correspondence going back and forth between the business 
school and MSCI. It’s been going on for a year. I’ll let you know what becomes of it, 
but I wouldn’t hold your breath. 
Lewis: Ok. Well, I think those were my main questions. First, I wanted to know your 
thoughts on KLD’s primary objectives and whether there was an implicit moral or 
ethical objective and it sounds like you confirmed that. Second, I wanted to hear your 
opinions on whether you thought firms actually responded to their ratings. It appears 
based on what you said that even if companies didn’t respond that they were at least 
aware of the ratings. 
Lydenberg: I think it’s fair to say that the firm was made aware of the ratings. 
Beyond that it’s pretty much speculation. 
Lewis: Ok great. Well just to provide a little more information about my results, I find 
that firms that received the charitable giving rating actually decreased their subsequent 
contributions after being rated. While I’m trying to work out the theoretical arguments 
here, I think the reason has something to do with the uncertainty that firms face about 
how much they should give. And then along comes this third party rating that’s 
essentially sets a standard for being recognized as a charitable organization. And I 
think what happened is that many of these firms saw the new threshold for recognition 
as an acceptable appropriate level and give and thereby decreased their subsequent 
contributions to the threshold level. 
Lydenberg: Hmm. 
 102 
Lewis: I’m still working on my analyses and collecting some more data. But that’s 
what my initial findings demonstrate. 
Lydenberg: Hmm, couldn’t it also be a general shift in the philosophy of corporate 
giving during the 1990s. 
Lewis: It certainly could be. However, I used as control group firms that were never 
rated to rule out that explanation. So when I say they reduced their contributions, it’s 
relative to this control group of firms that were never rated. In any event, that’s where 
I’m at, so if you’re interested, I’d be glad to send the paper to you when I’m done. 
Lydenberg: Absolutely yes. I would be very interested. 
Lewis: Great. Well, I appreciate your time. This was very helpful to me. 
Lydenberg: Okay, any time. 
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